



THE  
PAKISTAN ISSUE



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*BEING*  
*the correspondence between*  
Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif  
and  
Mr. M.A. Jinnah on the one  
hand, and between him and  
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,  
Dr. Rajendra Prasad and  
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru  
on the other, and connected  
papers on the subject of  
PAKISTAN

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WITH A FOREWORD BY

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## CONTENTS

FOREWORD by Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif	...	...	vii
PREFATORY NOTE by Nawab Dr. Nazir Yar Jung	...	...	xix
SECTION I.—Correspondence with Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru <i>re</i> the formation of Sovereign States for Muslim Zones	...	...	1
SECTION II.—Constituent Assembly	...	...	41
SECTION III.—Dr. Latif's Constitutional Scheme and his correspondence with Mr. M. A. Jinnah	...	...	48
SECTION IV.—Report of the Constitution Committee appointed to prepare a plan for implementing the provisions of the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League and correspondence with Mr. M. A. Jinnah and Sir Abdullah Haroon connected therewith	...	...	67
SECTION V.—'Substance of Pakistan' Proposal, and correspondence with Mr. M. A. Jinnah and Dr. Rajendra Prasad in connection therewith	...	...	101
SECTION VI.—Correspondence with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru <i>re</i> the right of secession for territorial units	...	...	114

SECTION VII.—Press Statements of Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif :

1. On Interim Government	...	127
2. On Non-Party Leaders' Bombay Conference	... ..	129
3. On Cripps' Mission	... ..	130
4. On Mr. Rajagopalachariar's move : "Right of self-determination"	... ..	131
5. On Congress Working Committee's "Quit India" resolution	... ..	133
6. On Mr. Jinnah's Policy	...	133
7. On League Resolution of August, 1942	... ..	139
8. On Interim Government : Formula		141
9. On Revision of League's Policy	...	144
10. On Mr. Rajagopalachariar's New Proposal for Interim Government	...	144
11. On League's Position	... ..	152
12. On Proposed Deputation to the Viceroy	... ..	155
13. On Dr. Ambedkar's Proposal to end Deadlock	... ..	156
14. On Gandhi-Jinnah Letter	...	158

## FOREWORD

I am grateful to my friend Dr. Nawab Nazir Yar Jung Bahadur for the kindly care with which he has edited the correspondence and papers given in this volume, and for contributing to it a comprehensive note tracing the genesis and development of the Pakistan idea and clarifying the immediate problem at issue.

The matter is distributed into seven sections. Section I & II deal with the initial stage when the idea was struggling to take shape. They may be looked into just to catch a glimpse of the background to what follows. Sections II to IV are of primary importance, and it is on them that the public mind is invited to concentrate. They deal directly with the Pakistan scheme of the Muslim League as outlined in its Lahore Resolution of 1940—the resolution by which the League still stands. The closing section VII which consists of press statements issued by me by way of reaction to the policy pursued by the League in recent months is also of importance, as it elucidates and clinches the standpoint pressed for attention in the preceding sections.

And what is this standpoint? I do not oppose 'Pakistan' or the formation of sovereign states in the North-West and the North-East where the Muslims form a predominant majority in popula-



tion. Let that be clear to everybody. Indeed, how can I, having been the first in the field, as admitted by the leaders of the League, to have nursed the idea of allowing to every cultural zone, Hindu or Muslim, a sovereign existence, and the first to outline a constitution for India on that basis? Where then do I differ from the Muslim League, or rather from the point of view developed by its president, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, contrary, as I think, to the spirit of the Lahore Resolution?

Mr. Jinnah insists that the Pakistan states should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relation with the rest of India. I, on the other hand, hold that such an attitude will prove suicidal to the Pakistan states. I firmly believe that in the abiding interests of these states themselves and of the thinly distributed Muslim minorities in Hindu Zones, they should, while enjoying perfect freedom or autonomy in their internal affairs, link themselves to the rest of India to administer with others on terms of equality a minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India.

I have examined the implications of isolation, particularly its economic and geographical, with every care and concern. The irresistible conclusion that has forced itself on me is that the proposed states, when isolated from the rest of India, will soon or late find themselves unable to maintain their independence, and in consequence will either lapse into the position of a dependency or protectorate of some foreign power or return

chastened in spirit to the Indian Union. That is a prospect I have shuddered against.

Under the principle of the Lahore Resolution, you will have for your Pakistan states only those areas where the Muslims are in real or predominant majority. You will thus have to forego in the North-West nearly a half of the Punjab—the Ambala division and the Kangra Valley, and confine yourself to the West of Lahore. In the North East, you cannot claim much beyond the Eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam. If you wish to carve out for any reason larger states, you can only do so either by absorbing the Muslim population of the entire North by means of exchange of population and on that basis asking for additional space, or by the free consent of the adjoining non-Muslim areas which you would like to include in the new states. Exchange of population is somehow disagreeable to you. You are earth-rooted unlike the Muslims of old. The only alternative for you is to obtain the consent of the non-Muslims to promote your purpose. If you succeed in your attempt, you will certainly have larger states to administer; but they will not possess the requisite features of a Muslim state properly so-called. They will be composite states and not 'Pakistan' and will have naturally to be governed by composite governments. You cannot, as is your dream and hope establish therein *حکومت الہیہ* for the 'Rule of God' or of the *Shariyyat* and cannot treat the non-Muslims as *Zimmis* or protected subjects. And then you will have to bear in mind

that composite states will be miniature Indias confronting you with the same age-long communal problems which, under the altered or new conditions, will call for methods of solution other than those suggested by the Lahore Resolution.?

If however the Muslim League is in earnest to have a real 'Pakistan', it will have to give up every idea of ruling over areas in the North-West and North-East which are predominantly populated by non-Muslims. That will be insisted upon by the other parties, when the time comes for you to exercise the right of self-determination which you have asked for. Under that right, you will not get for your realm anything beyond the two poverty-stricken patches which I have delineated above and where alone you are truly in the majority—patches torn from each other by vast spaces of land and sea, and incapable of evolving between them any unified life or federal administration. Some wise heads among the Leaguers have suggested a corridor between the two wings of Pakistan, a long corridor running through a territory populated predominantly by non-Muslims. Is such a claim tenable? Does the Lahore Resolution allow it? The sea is no doubt God's sea. It can certainly link the two states together, as it does the British Empire. But can you develop a powerful navy to preserve that linkage, especially in times of stress and war?

Further, can you run a modern state with your economic resources so limited and undeveloped? Can you meet the cost of defence unaided under

modern conditions? Do you possess all the raw materials required by heavy industries, and other natural resources so essential to national self-sufficiency? And why should you deny yourselves the larger resources of India when they are yours by every natural right?

Geographical and economic considerations apart, of what use will your 'Pakistan' state in isolation be to the millions of Muslims, who will, on your account, be left eternal orphans in an independent Hindu India? The Lahore Resolution seeks to provide "mandatory safeguards" for them. But who is to be the mandatory authority? Britain? Pakistan? What are the sanctions to be applied? Will they be applied every time the Muslim minorities are in trouble? Will an independent Hindu India agree at all to an external mandate. There are some spirited people in the camp of the League who recommend retaliation for a remedy! "Crush the Hindu minority in Pakistan if the Muslim minority is crushed in Hindustan!" Suppose the Hindus of Pakistan are a law abiding people and are devoted citizens of the state. Will you still have the heart to crush them? Does Islam permit it?

Take the cultural implication of isolation into consideration. We talk of a single Muslim nation of India. Where will that nation be, if it is parcelled out among several independent states or dominions having no organic relationship with one another? Will we be able to retain or develop our cultural unity? Will not some of us who will be

left in Hindu Zones slowly succumb to the impact of a vivified and dominating non-Muslim culture zealously fostered by an independent and powerful non-Muslim state, and cut themselves off for ever from the main current of Islamic life in India? Are the words of Hali then to prove prophetic in their case, words uttered in anguish in his *Shikwa-i-Hind*:

Yea, by and by, the Wheel of Time

Will obliterate all memories;

We will forget of what trees were we the fruits,

Where gathered and where sold?

Is not this already our plight in the rural parts (so rarely visited by our leaders), of most of the provinces and Indian states where, in dress, manners, customs and modes of living and even beliefs, the so-called Muslims are not materially different from the lower classes of Hindus? Will not the creation of an absolutely independent 'Hindu-stan' and the complete isolation from it of the Muslim strongholds of 'Pakistan' intensify the process?

And then what to be the future of the Muslim Indian States, most of which are surrounded on all sides by Hindu Zones and are predominantly populated by Hindus? Are they to live on terms of dependence on Hindu-stan, or shall they occupy an honourable place in a Commonwealth of the whole of India?

These are some of the aspects of the problem which call for the consideration of the League. It was in view of these that as far back as 1939, in the very first constitutional scheme which came up before the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, I suggested the formation of a

Union of India composed of sovereign states which should delegate certain common subjects to a centre agreeable to the Pakistan states, the Muslim minorities in Hindu-stan and even the Muslim Indian states. The need for some sort of a centre was stressed by other schemes as well which came in later for the consideration of the League's Executive, chiefly those proposed by the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, "A Punjabi" and Mr. Syed Rizwan-ullah of Lucknow. It was in admission of this need that the Lahore Resolution of 1940 had to authorise the Working Committee of the League to 'frame a scheme of constitution', 'providing for the assumption *finally* by the respective regions (N.W. and N.E. Muslim Zones) of all powers such as Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs and such other matters as may be necessary'. What does this provision mean? Does it not suggest that the Pakistan states will have for some time to come at least or, as a transitional measure, to join hands with others to administer these subjects for the whole of India? On what basis then is Mr. Jinnah so insistently telling the world that there should be no centre of any kind whatsoever, now or ever, for India? If so, who is to administer the subjects mentioned in the Lahore Resolution till Pakistan is in a position to take them over? Does he want them to be vested in London? Will the League really agree to that? If it does, what will be the constitutional position of Pakistan? It cannot be regarded as a Dominion in terms of the Statute of Westminster or in terms of the Cripps' plan; for,

a Dominion looks after all these subjects. Will not then Pakistan be no better than a Dependency or a helpless Protectorate? Is that the fate for which we are to work?

Let the League read the portents of the times. What are the chances of getting a Pakistan in isolation? The Indian parties without whose consent no agreed constitution can be framed for India have set their face against it. The British trend of mind also is distinctly not in favour of splitting India into several Dominions. The League may invoke the non-accession provisions of the Cripps' plan. But is not the purpose of the provisions manifest? Prof. Reginald Coupland who was on the staff of Sir Stafford in India points out that those provisions were really meant to dissuade the League from pursuing Pakistan. "These provisions" he says in his *'Cripps' Mission* "were based on a profound psychological truth", and continues:

The story of the forbidden fruit applies to great affairs of life as much as small. The certain method of whetting a nation's or a community's appetite for something is to say that it is the one thing they may not have. Thus, just as there is small chance of India wanting to stay in the British Commonwealth unless she is free to go out, so the best hope of a single Indian Union is to assure the people of the predominantly Moslem areas that they need not join it unless they wish. As Sir Stafford had said in his broadcast, the door must be left open.

In many of my conversations with Hindus, I urged this method of dealing with Pakistan; and several of them, including two leading Congressmen, agreed with me.

This may not be a straight or fair method of dealing with serious issues. But its meaning is unmistakable. If the Indian political parties do not reach a settlement between themselves in respect of India's future constitution, and Britain is eventually called upon to arbitrate, it will frankly decide in favour of the federal ideal. It may not be a federation of the orthodox type with its majority rule and parliamentary executive; but it is bound to be some sort of a union all the same. Let the League make no mistake about it. Lord Linlithgow's farewell address to the Princes looks like the writing on the wall.

What then are we to do in such circumstances? If a union is inevitable, the wise course is to grasp it and bend it to our purpose. The only alternative to this procedure is to fight the opposing forces, both the British Government and the non-Muslim parties. But shall the fight be over an issue like '*Pakistan in isolation*' which, as I have shown above will prove a nightmare for us? It will look like fighting for the right of suicide. The issue must be something worth fighting for, something, noble and great. Let the League prepare its own plan of a Union of Sovereign states and fix the features of a centre where no fear shall overtake us, and from where we shall be able to protect the interests of Muslim minorities and Muslim Indian States, and look after the common affairs of India as a whole on terms of perfect equality with others and share its larger and fuller life. The outline of a constitutional plan appearing on pages 50 to 57



and round which much of the material given in this volume including my correspondence with Mr. Jinnah and Congress leaders revolves, might probably be found useful in drafting a scheme. Let this be done first. There is no question of prestige involved here. It will be simply implementing the last paragraph of the Lahore Resolution, so far neglected, and giving it a more permanent value. You will have won half the battle if that is done. The World will then begin to sympathise with you; for here will be a plan of union and not of disruption. Let us therefore state our terms specifically. The policy of hide and seek is never a manly policy. We shall fight everybody, when having conceived our own needs on rational lines, and stated them, we are deliberately denied their fulfilment.

What is the present situation? The largest party in the land, the Congress, has expressed its willingness to agree to a union, the units of which shall enjoy several elements of sovereignty *viz.*, the largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession. The smaller parties especially the Hindu Mahasabha and the Liberals, do not favour the last two provisions; but their voice is of secondary importance. The British mind is inclined towards not a Union of sovereign units but a federation of provinces with greater autonomy conceded to them than what is provided for in the Constitution of 1935. Even this attitude is of no serious consequence, as the framing of a new constitution is left entirely to the Indian parties themselves.

So, the nearest approach to what might satisfy us has been made by the Congress and it is up to us to examine its offer dispassionately. The picture of units as envisaged by that body may be carefully analysed and wherever necessary made to conform to our needs through direct negotiations. The Congress has not so far defined the centre. Let that be done by the League. Indeed, it is for the League to say what would satisfy it and, on the basis of which a settlement might be reached. The centre of a Union of sovereign units will, of course, be different in its composition and character from the centre of a Federation of dependent provinces and subservient Indian States. It will necessarily be a composite centre following an agreed policy and allowing no unit or community, or combination of units or communities to dominate the rest and yet affording to one and all the necessary urge to work together for a common country. A settlement between the two chief political organisations is bound to have a favourable reaction in other camps, and contribute in no small measure to the removal of the country's deadlock with the British Government, and help considerably the framing of a new Constitution agreeable to everyone. Will the League try to prevail upon the new Viceroy to afford it the necessary facilities for direct negotiations with the Congress?

The hour is one of trial for both the Congress and the League ; of searching introspection ; and of a return to sanity.

Hyderabad-Dn. }  
December 1, 1943. }

S. A. LATIF.



## PREFATORY NOTE

by

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IT is a privilege to edit the correspondence and papers given in this volume, as they deal with the views of a scholar and thinker for whom I have a sincere and personal regard and who has, from his seclusion in Hyderabad, powerfully affected and indeed given a new turn to Muslim political thought in India.

To appraise the services of Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif in the field of Muslim politics, and of the country at large, one must go back to the year 1936-37 when he felt the urge to come out of his academic atmosphere at the Osmania University and to interest himself in

\*The Nawab Sahib before he joined the Judicial service of H. E. H. the Nizam's Government was a prominent public worker in his native province of U.P. From 1912 to 1919, the Nawab Sahib, known in those days as Dr. Nazir-ud-din Hasan, was an active member of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, and was Joint Secretary of the Reception Committee of the historic session of the All-India Congress held in 1916 at Lucknow, when the famous Congress-League Pact was affected. He was for two years (1916-1918) Secretary for Oudh of the Home Rule League founded by Mrs. Besant. The Nawab has been for several years, taking a keen interest in the affairs of the Muslim University as a member of its Court, as also in the working of the Osmania University as a member of its Senate and as Dean of its Faculty of Theology.—*Publisher*

the political life of the Indian Muslims. The provincial part of the Constitution Act of 1935 had just been inaugurated, giving the Congress a decided position of vantage in a greater part of the country. The Muslim League had, as a reaction to this, to reorganize itself. But it had no specific goal before it. The utmost that it could think of was to fit into the Congress goal and programme on the basis of cultural safeguards for Muslims. But what those safeguards should be, no responsible Muslim leader could state! Indeed the Congress President, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, was bluntly asking the Muslims what the Muslim culture itself was and where was it to be found in India. The question was first raised by him in his *Autobiography* and then formed a perennial theme of the various speeches which he delivered about this time throughout the country. His contention was that the Muslim culture was not materially different from the culture of the Hindus and the talk of any special cultural safeguards for the Muslims was therefore a meaningless proposition.

This was the time when Dr. Latif stepped into the political field. He had, by now, been widely known to the Muslim intelligentsia all over the country through his literary and cultural studies and regarded by them as a scholar and critic of outstanding merits. So, when he made a tour of India to understand the political situation and made a special concern of his to visit Aligarh and Delhi, he was attracted by the leading professors of Aligarh and Jamia Millia with whom he exchanged views and on whom he impressed the need for counteracting the

propaganda which questioned the very idea of the Muslims possessing any culture differing from the culture of the Hindus, and which discredited the thought of any special cultural safeguards of the Indian Muslims.

While Dr. Latif was at Delhi, the late Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal invited him to Lahore. The few days that he lived with the Poet were days of much constructive thinking. The Poet was known, through the Presidential address he had delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League held in 1931 at Allahabad to entertain the thought of bringing the whole of the North-Western India into a single administration, an idea long in existence in a hazily Pan-Islamic form. It was Dr. Latif who emphasized the fact that this was by no means a complete solution of the cultural problem of the Muslims of the whole of India and that a scheme should be devised such as might comprehend the needs of the Muslims not merely of the North-West but of the Muslims of Bengal and Assam where also they were in the majority ; and comprehend above all the needs of the Muslim minorities so thinly distributed from Delhi, Lucknow, Patna downwards to Cape Comorin ; as also of the Muslim Indian States.

As a result of his tour, Dr. Latif founded the "Muslim Culture Society" composed mainly of the higher Muslim intellectual talent available in Hyderabad, and himself delivered its inaugural address in August 1937 with Nawab Sir Nizam Jung Bahadur in the chair. The meeting was attended by Mrs.

Sarojini Naidu and the late Maulana Shaukat Ali who happened to be in Hyderabad at the time. The address was entitled, "The Muslim Culture in India," and was a direct answer to Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru. The address which was widely published both in English and Urdu created a stir in every political circle, and raised in the Muslim mind a sense of dignity and pride and of new hopes and new aspirations.

The address made it clear that the culture of Islam was not a culture which attached importance to the mere externalia of life. It was, on the other hand, an expression of the inner forces of Muslim life, and embodied two fundamental laws of human existence—the law of movement, and the law of unity, stimulating and welcoming on the one hand every urge for progress and on the other striving to let that urge subserve or advance the cause of unity in life. The abiding or permanent form in which it manifested itself was the law of Islam called the *Shariyyat* which moulded its followers into a distinct social order with its own problems to solve on its own lines—problems, educational, social, economic, and political, national and international. Indeed, it was a culture to be preserved as a force for national emancipation, if its intrinsic value could only be properly appreciated by the non-Muslims.

Such was the basic argument which Dr. Latif supplied to the Muslim demand for cultural safeguards. But when soon after the Congress clearly admitted the principle of cultural safeguards at its Haripura Session in February 1938 and Mr. Jinnah the Presi-

dent of the Muslim League was asked to table the safeguards, the League President had no plan to offer. He simply referred the Congress President Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, to an article written by an anonymous writer appearing in the *Statesman* of the 12th February 1938 and an article in a *Muslim Weekly* of Lahore, the *New Times* of the 1st of March, 1938, and strangely enough to a press interview of Mr. M. S. Aney wherein he had mentioned some of the things which the Muslim League might demand. (*Vide*, Nehru-Jinnah correspondence published by the Secretary, A.I.C.C. from Allahabad, 1938.)

This seemed to Dr. Latif a humiliating situation. He felt that the absence of any specific plan of cultural and other safeguards was due primarily to the absence of any specific goal for the Muslims to aim at. He therefore wrote that stimulating pamphlet of his—*The Cultural Future of India*, wherein he called upon the Indian Muslims to develop the vision of a future which should secure for them autonomous zones where they could live a life of their own and from where they could work for the good of the country as a whole. He knew that a homogeneous nation for India was not possible so long as the Muslims and the Hindus insisted on following cultures of their own, fundamentally different one from the other. And yet he felt confident that the two communities might form a nation of the type of Canada where two different races lived in separate zones of their own while working together for a common country. He, therefore, suggested for the consideration of both the Hindus and the



Muslims the establishment of a federation of culturally homogeneous states or zones to be evolved wherever necessary even by means of an exchange of population spread conveniently over a number of years. He, however, made it clear that this was to be resorted to as a last resort and only when every other means was exhausted to frame a constitution agreeable to every party concerned, a constitution such as might "not allow any community, or combination of units to dominate the rest." As a basis of compromise, he even outlined a constitution alternative to the Act of 1935 such as might fulfil the above condition.

The plan provoked reaction in every camp. It caught the imagination of the Musalmans in particular as nothing else had done before. Sir Abdullah Haroon, a member of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League gives expression to this reaction in his preface to *The Muslim Problem in India* (1939) written by Dr. Latif to give a concrete shape to the general plan outlined in *The Cultural Future of India*. Says he :

"Last year when *The Cultural Future of India* was issued by Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif suggesting the establishment of a federation of culturally homogeneous states for India as a solution—possibly a lasting solution to the age-long and vexed Hindu-Muslim problem, I was so much impressed with his outlook, that I invited him to Lahore in order that he might discuss his views with the members of the Foreign Committee of the Muslim League which was to meet there on the 29th January 1939. (The Premier of the Punjab, the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and the late Nawab

Sahib of Mamdote who afterwards prepared amended schemes of their own attended the meeting. Sir Feroz Khan Noon who was then on a brief visit to Lahore from London was present informally. As a result of his conversations with them, he was requested to prepare a scheme under which the goal suggested might be reached by successive stages. In response to this request, Dr. Latif has framed a constitution for India—alternative to the one provided for in the Government of India Act of 1935 and calculated to mark the first stage in the fulfilment of the object in view. His draft constitution is now receiving the consideration of the Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League and to it, at my special instance, he has now contributed a comprehensive introduction."

In continuation of this, I may quote a letter from Sir Abdullah Haroon himself addressed to Dr. Latif on 5th January, 1940 expressing his great pleasure at the favourable reaction his plan had in England. It may be stated here that Sir Abdullah Haroon, as Chairman of the League's Foreign Committee had circulated widely Dr. Latif's brochure both in England and India.

The letter runs :

" It gives me great pleasure to find that your booklet *Muslem Problem in India* has received great popularity in England and many people view it as being an excellent representation of Muslim opinion.

Apart from the above, I have been recipient of some other letters also, which undoubtedly show that the book has been appreciated by a large section of public-minded people.

Under the circumstances, I must express my utmost thanks for the labour you undertook for the

supreme cause of Musalmans by evolving such a scheme which if materialised embodies in itself the separate and free Home-lands for Musalmans in India."

To give an idea of the British reaction to Dr. Latif's plan, I may reproduce here an extract from the editorial review contributed to the "Great Britain and the East" of the 14th December 1939 by Prof. Rushbrook Williams, wherein he recommends Dr. Abdul Latif's brochure to the British public for careful study. Says he :

"This little book is important because it is not written from the British point of view, nor from the Pan-Islamic point of view, but the Indian point of view. The author counts himself as good a nationalist as anyone else; but he is determined to oppose the kind of nationalism which would eliminate Islam as a political force in India.

We commend it to those well-intentioned critics who believe that the minority problem is a nettle which needs only to be grasped firmly and with courage in order to render the spines impotent. This particular spine is far more likely to pierce the hand which fails to show it proper respect.

In the meanwhile several schemes came in by way of a reaction to Dr. Latif's plan....schemes generally known as 'Pakistan' schemes particularly from the Punjab and U.P. These schemes while accepting Dr. Latif's basic idea of separate zones for the Muslims, suggested various amendments to his plan. Some of these like those proposed by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, "A Punjabi", and Mr. Syed Rizwanullah of Lucknow, set their plan against an All-India

background. But there were others like the Aligarh Scheme which deliberately advocated the absolute partition of the country into independent Muslim zones and independent Hindu zones.

While these schemes were being considered by the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, Dr. Rajendra Prasad opened up correspondence with Dr. Latif on the subject of his zonal plan. This correspondence together with the correspondence on the same subject with Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru as given in Section I, marks the first stage in Dr. Latif's attempt to persuade the Congress to effect a reconciliation with the Muslim League on the basis of an agreed constitution for India on the lines indicated by him. Indeed, in his reply to Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru dated the 10th January, 1940, Dr. Latif held out a friendly warning:

"The idea of cultural zones is a mild idea compared with that of Pakistan. But that will be thrown into the limbo of oblivion, and the spectre of Pakistan alone will stare you in the face tomorrow, if today you fail to use your opportunities to frame a constitution for the country agreeable to all." (*Vide* p. 25)

Had the Congress agreed to the leading features of Dr. Latif's proposal at this stage, instead of agreeing to the more important of them at a later stage, it was likely that the Lahore Resolution of Pakistan would have assumed a different form altogether.

When the Lahore Resolution was passed in March, 1940, it was thought that it warranted an

absolute partition of the country into two independent federations, one for the Muslims, the other for the Hindus. But Dr. Latif took a different view of it. He held that its provisions could be interpreted in terms of a single constitution for India ; and consequently he revised his original outline for an Alternative Constitution to show that even now, even on the basis of constituting the North-West and North-East into sovereign states, a union for the whole of India could still be evolved such as should be agreeable to the Congress. This revised outline formed the subject of an invitation to Dr. Latif through Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, a member of the Congress Working Committee to meet in his ' purely individual capacity and without prejudice ' some prominent members of the Congress Working Committee to elucidate a few points therein for the " purpose of clarification of issues that might lead to an agreed solution." (p. 58) Mr. Jinnah, of whom Dr. Latif had enquired, out of a natural courtesy, whether he had any objection to his meeting Congress leaders, stood in the way. He wired to Dr. Latif as follows :

"Regret cannot agree (your) meeting Congress Working Committee. Any Congress Hindu Leader welcomed see me."

The issue was not that any Congress leaders should meet Mr. Jinnah to elicit elucidation from him of any aspects of Dr. Latif's constitutional plan but that they should have a personal discussion with Dr. Latif himself as author of the plan, with a view no doubt to seeing whether the plan could form a

reasonable basis of settlement of the Indian problem. Had Dr. Latif accepted the invitation, it was not unlikely that the issues which the Congress clarified in the August of 1942 would have been clarified earlier, thereby paving the way to formal negotiations with the League.

Although out of deference to Mr. Jinnah's wishes, he did not meet the Congress leaders at this stage, Dr. Latif entered into correspondence with Mr. Jinnah questioning the validity of the objection to his meeting any body interested in his plan and also questioning the very tenability of the Lahore Resolution. (*Vide* Section III.)

In this correspondence, Dr. Latif contends (p. 64) that the Lahore Resolution "lacked background and that its provision, particularly the provision of mandatory safeguards for Muslim minorities, needed to be fitted into an all India framework."

"My contention," says he "is that the provisions of safeguards for minorities, 'mandatory' as the Resolution qualifies them, will argue some reciprocal all-India arrangement such as can be effectively enforced. Indeed the Resolution states that for some-time to come at least, the exercise of powers in respect of Defence, External Relations, Customs, Communications, etc. will not be assumed by the States you would carve out. In other words, the Resolution anticipates a transitional All-India Constitution at least for these subjects. That is one of the reasons why I have provided a Centre—a Centre which should be agreeable to you and from where the Hindus 'will not be in a position to dominate the Muslims.' (*Vide* the provisions in this respect under Representation on Legisla-

ture (3) and Executive (2), pages 3 and 4 of the proposed constitution as redrafted three months ago with a view to implementing the Lahore Resolution and forwarded to Sir Abdulla Haroon for the Consideration of his Constitution Committee, copy enclosed.")

In response to Mr. Jinnah's suggestion (p. 63) that Dr. Latif's previous talks with him held at Delhi on the subject of the Lahore Resolution should be resumed, Dr. Latif met Mr. Jinnah again at Delhi in November 1940 and at the same time, he attended all the meetings of the Constitutional Committee convened there under the auspices of the Foreign Committee of the All-India Muslim League to prepare a constitutional scheme implementing the Lahore Resolution. In his resumed talks with Mr. Jinnah, I understand, Dr. Latif made it clear to him that the Leagues' resolve to defer the assumption by Pakistan of powers of Defence, External relations, customs, communications, etc., for some time meant that these powers were to be vested till then in some authority external to Pakistan states and that unless as proposed by him these were vested in a centre common to India as a whole, they would have to vest in London, which surely the Resolution did not contemplate. To this there was no satisfactory answer from Mr. Jinnah. From the Constitution Sub-Committee, however, there was a better response. It agreed to provide a Centre for the whole of India. Its report (Section IV) is a document of great importance and goes to emphasize that the Lahore Resolution

could not be interpreted except in terms of Dr. Latif's recommendations. Mr. Jinnah disowned this committee later on. But its findings stand and deserve consideration even at this hour.

It was Dr. Latif's hope that the League at its next session at Madras in 1941 would take a larger view of the Lahore Resolution. To his great regret, however, he found that the plan of this Resolution which at best was a programme that could be altered or given up as circumstances warranted, was *on the spot* deliberately incorporated into the very text of the creed of the Muslim League at a session from which the leading members from Sind, U. P., the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, including the Premiers of the last three provinces, were absent.

This was going headlong with a wilful disregard of its unfortunate reaction on the Congress. Still Dr. Latif did not lose hope. To bring about a rapprochement yet between the Congress and the League, he suggested a compromise (*Vide* Section V), on the basis of the Congress conceding to Muslims the substance of Pakistan consistent, however, with the unity of India as a whole. The following were the leading features of the compromise suggested :

1. The federating units of an All-India union to be sovereign states, two of these sovereign states being one to the North-West and the other to the North-East where the Muslims were in a majority.
2. Units to possess largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of



secession.

3. The centre to deal with a minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India as mutually delegated to it by the different units.

4. The Centre to be so constituted as not to allow any community or combination of units to dominate the rest.

Dr. Latif was firmly convinced in mind that any constitution which embodied these provisions would effect a harmony between the Muslim demand for Pakistan states and the demand of the Congress and other parties for the preservation of the unity of India.

The proposal was put forward in a circular letter to select leaders of the leading parties. While doing so, he wrote specially to Mr. Jinnah :

"I pray you to give an earnest thought to the enclosed. As you know, I have, during the last few years, in my own humble way, tried to support the cause of the League, and so I hope you will not misunderstand me when I have ventured to suggest a compromise at this stage with the other parties on the basis of conceding to the Muslims the *substance* of your demand.

I am not in the habit of raising an alarm ; but allow me to say that your Madras Resolution has saddened some of your best friends including me. The Pakistan idea has served its purpose. It has roused the necessary political consciousness among the Muslims. But that consciousness now needs to run into practical channels. And I suggest to you that if you should find that the Congress, in particular, is willing to consider in consultation with you the formula advanced in the circular, you will do well to welcome such a move.

I have too great a regard for you to see you handle roughly by your critics, and I am afraid that that will be your experience if the League is allowed to persist in an overstatement of its case any longer. As I have made no secret of my views to you, I may repeat that the Pakistan scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim States properly so-called; nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem; nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India, unless a wholesale exchange of population is effected which no one favours. I am not the only person to hold this view. A compromise on the basis of *complete separation* is unthinkable, and I, therefore, entreat you to give your best thought to the proposal. It will save faces on either side. The proposal is a compromise between two extreme views, and should be worthy of your kindest consideration."

Section V, shows the nature of the immediate reaction of the general mind of the Congress as revealed through the correspondence of Dr. Rajendra Prasad. But Mr. Jinnah remained silent. Dr. Latif did not, however, relax his efforts. He met Mr. Gandhi and the leading members of the Congress Working Committee in Bombay in the first week of August 1942. The resolution of the Congress passed in Bombay on 8th August 1942 and the correspondence dated the 6th August (Section VI) between Dr. Latif and the Congress President Maulana Azad and Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru marked a historical stage in the Congress reaction to the Substance of Pakistan proposal. The Congress at this stage agreed to:

1. The largest measure of autonomy to federating units.

2. Residuary powers to units,
3. The right of secession to units.

All these argued sovereign status to units including Pakistan states. It was intended by the Congress leaders to open negotiations on this basis, but their arrest on the 9th August 1942 came in the way. Had negotiations opened, Dr. Latif expected that the only outstanding item in his plan of compromise, *viz.*, the provision of a Centre agreeable to the Muslims, would be settled to the satisfaction of the Muslim League.\*

The Congress, be it noted, 'had now gone a long way to placate the Muslim League ; and every one expected that Mr. Jinnah would, at least at this stage, take a long view of things and see in what manner the several points conceded by the Congress constituted an agreeable substitute for his 'Pakistan in isolation.' This he did not. On the other hand, he tried to belittle Dr. Latif's services and to disregard the Congress advances.

Apparently tired of attempting to bring round the Leagues' Executive to the path of constructive statesmanship, Dr. Latif's appeals now are no longer addressed to it but to his co-religionists at large, particularly the educated among them. The tone, as the press statements given in Section VII, show, is growing of late more and more critical of the Leagues' policy. But who can question his sincerity of purpose ? By his single-minded devotion to the cause of Indian unity on the basis of perfect security

\*The subject of an agreeable centre is discussed afresh by Dr. Latif in his foreword to this volume.

for the Muslims, he has established his position in the country as an institution by himself. Unattached to any party, he nevertheless commands the respect of the liberal-minded among all the parties. Even the League circles, in spite of his recent differences with their outlook, never refer to him in any unkindly style, for they feel and know that at heart he is one of them, although for the sake of freedom of thought or action and disinterested service, he has chosen to work for their organisation from outside of it. Indeed, the League's attitude towards him might be expressed tersely in the language of Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan of Meerut, the Senior Member of the League's Working Committee when only last year, on 28th May, 1942 addresseing a Press Conference at Hyderabad he said :

"The Pakistan scheme adumbrated by the League is different from Dr. Latif's scheme, but the basic principles are the same, the separation of different cultural units. Dr. Latif has undoubtedly rendered a great service in putting forward forcibly the Muslim point of view in regard to the future of India ; and his was the first scheme sent to the League President for consideration by the League Working Committee."—

A. P. I.

At the present moment when the League is wilfully committed to a policy of Pakistan in isolation, it may not be easy for its leaders to openly recognize the value of Dr. Latif's sustained efforts to rescue the league from an impossible position and give its outlook a coherence by linking Pakistan to the rest

of India. But the time is drawing close when the League will be obliged to revise its attitude and restate its case in terms of a larger and fuller life for the Indian Muslims than what is possible under the idea of "Pakistan in isolation". Against that inevitable hour, Dr. Latif has made ample provision.

This volume gives enough food for those who wish to reflect.

*Manzil-i-Adl*  
*Hyderguda,*  
*Hyderabad-Deccan*  
*29th Nov., 1943*

NAZIR YAR JUNG

## INTRODUCTION

[This correspondence deals with the constitutional scheme for India outlined by the author in *The Cultural Future of India* and developed in *The Muslim Problem in India*, popularly known as the "Cultural Zones Scheme." For brevity's sake, it may be stated that the author's solution to the vexed Hindu-Muslim problem was the establishment of a Federation of culturally homogeneous States for India formed wherever necessary through a peaceful intermigration spread conveniently over a number of years. This plan was suggested as the goal to be reached. Under this plan four main States were proposed to constitute Muslim zones ; (1) a state to the North-West, (2) a state to the North-East, (3) a state carved out of the present U.P., (4) Dominions of Hyderabad with an opening to the sea. The rest of India was to be resolved into eleven states formed more or less on the linguistic or cultural lines favoured by the Congress.

As a transition to it, the author outlined a constitution for India, alternative to the one provided for in the Government of India Act, 1935 and calculated to mark the first stage in the fulfilment of the object in view. This outline is reproduced here to help the understanding of points raised in the correspondence.

The view held by the author was that this transitional or alternative constitutional plan could by itself serve as a lasting solution, should the Congress and the League and other parties resolve to work it in the spirit of mutual trust and goodwill. In fact, in his correspondence with the two Congress leaders, he lays greater emphasis on this than on the ideal itself, which he points out was "conceived more in sorrow than in any wilful wish." The emphasis was laid particularly in view of the fact that this alternative constitutional scheme was during

the period of this correspondence under the consideration of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League along with other schemes which favoured absolute partition of the country into Muslim India and Hindu India. To the regret of the author, both the Congress leaders evaded the immediate issue and directed all their criticism on only the ideal or what was remote. At a later stage (see Section VI) the Congress however accepted the leading features of the proposed constitutional plan. Had this been done when the author was pressing for them, the Lahore Resolution would likely have assumed a different form, and the country would have been spared the travail through which it has passed ever since.

This correspondence marks the first stage in the attempt made by the author to persuade the Congress to evolve a constitutional plan agreeable to the Muslims of India.]

## 1.

### ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTION\*

In the following pages, I have outlined a constitution for India which may mark the first step towards the realization of the zonal ideal described above. That outline may as well be considered on its own merits without reference to any such ideal, and as an immediate solution to the problem before us.

*In the first place*, the proposed constitution gives to every provincial federal unit as full an autonomy as is possible under the circumstances and adequately safeguards the rights of the Indian States and their rulers by reducing the federal list of subjects to a bare minimum. As a corollary to this, it provides for zonal or regional Boards for contiguous federal units possessing common affinities to evolve common policies in respect of subjects of cultural and economic importance common to them, leaving the individual units to legislate in the light of the policies so evolved. *In the second place*, the

\* Reproduced from the *Muslim Problem of India*.

proposed constitution gives to every provincial unit and the centre a composite stable executive with an agreed policy instead of a parliamentary executive in the English sense as provided for in the Act of 1935. *Lastly*, it provides a machinery whereby cultural and economic security may be afforded to the Muslim and other minorities at the centre as well as in the federal units.

These features may be considered *seriatim*.

## PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

We know that there is a body of opinion which supports the theory that in a federation the centre should retain as much of residuary power as possible. In other words, the centre should be quite strong. Such a theory could not hold good in a sub-continent like India. In fact, the idea of a federation composed of units of diversified character and following diversified systems of government ranging from autocracy to democratic autonomy would not be a federation in the strict sense of the term. It would at best become an arrangement to keep together units which owe allegiance in some manner to an Imperial centre. The truth is that India is vast and varied enough to be quite capable of forming itself into several natural federations on different cultural lines. But at this stage, it is necessary in the highest interests of the country as a whole that the divergent units should not all be yoked together except in matters which are absolutely common to all, such as defence, foreign affairs, commerce, communications and the like. To attempt to bring them all under a single administration for other purposes also, would be tantamount to a sort of forcible usurpation of the power which should vest in the federal units. The following are the chief directions in which this interference will make itself felt adversely :

1. India is a land where several cultures subsist side by side. There are, broadly speaking, two great cultures, the Muslim and the Hindu, each of which very often require separate treatment by legislation and otherwise. The Hindu culture is in reality a loose federation of several cultures



marked by differences in languages and customs, social habits and laws. For instance a Nambudiri Brahman of Malabar has nothing in common with a Machwa Brahman of Bengal or a half-Muslim Brahman Pandit of Kashmir. Each in his own individual jurisdiction supplies a background to the social life of the Hindus peculiar to the part of the country where he lives. Such examples can be easily multiplied to demonstrate the vertical as well as the oblique fissures cutting and separating the Hindu society throughout the country. If, suppose, a subject of cultural bearing should be adopted by legislation at a centre, it will mean forcing on the whole country a culture which would be, to say the least, quite inconsistent with the cultures of several units prevailing at the same time in numerous places! And when the fact is taken into consideration that a great community like the Musalmans will come under the purview of such a legislation, it is bound to result in a conflict and its accompanying stress and strain. The object and aim of the proposed scheme is to avoid such unpleasant contingencies and social disturbances. The provision holds good as much in the economic field as in other fields.

2. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Indian States are afraid to join the federation chiefly because they apprehend that the federal interference would operate adversely on their internal independence. As no federation would succeed unless and until the Indian States willingly and cheerfully join to work it, it would be the height of statesmanship to allay fears of the States in every respect. Under the proposed scheme they will have the necessary sense of security such as would make them willing and contented units of the federation.

3. From the standpoint of Muslims as of other minorities, it is necessary that the residuary powers should vest only in the units and in the proposed regional boards to the necessary extent. As minorities in most federal units, the position of the Muslims would be one of comparative dependence on the Hindu majority. If the centre also should exercise its jurisdiction in matters which might as well be dealt with by the constituent units, the position of the Muslims

and other minorities will become more difficult, because under the constitution of the Act of 1935, the majority community of India would not fail to dominate at the centre, as well as, in the units, subjecting the minorities to the treatment, as it were, of a double-edged sword. Such autonomy as the Muslims might have under the Act in a few provinces would become useless to them by reason of the domination of the great Hindu majority in the important subjects of the concurrent list. Should the "federal list" be confined to a bare minimum of items, it would certainly be a great relief, as it would give a sense of security to minority communities, as well as to hundreds of Indian States both large and small. After all, in a country where a single homogeneous nation is impossible to evolve, any attempt on the part of a majority community to seize power at the centre in the name of nationalism would be undiluted high-handedness which the Muslims who had long ruled that community could not brook under any circumstances whatsoever.

### ZONAL BOARDS

With full autonomy conceded to federal units by reducing the federal list of subjects to a bare minimum, and by eliminating in consequence the concurrent list altogether, the need will be felt for co-ordinating the activities of such contiguous units as enjoy common affinities in respect of subjects of cultural and economic importance common to them. To meet this need zonal or regional boards are suggested to enable such groups to evolve common policies on common problems, leaving the individual federal units, whether Indian States or Provinces, to legislate in the light of the common policies so evolved. The formation of such regional boards will dispense with the need of resolving such groups into sub-federations which will simply multiply administrative and legislative paraphernalia in the country.

### THE EXECUTIVE

It has already been explained how a parliamentary executive in India would in practice degenerate into a permanent

communal executive responsible only to a single majority community on whose sufferance all minorities would have to live. To safeguard against the possible tyranny of communal majority, the proposed alternative constitution provides for a stable though composite executive suited to the peculiar new conditions demonstrated above. Such an executive following an agreed policy would assure peace and order to the country in general and a complete sense of security to the minority communities in particular. The executive must needs be not only strong but also quite stable ; otherwise it would reflect the changing attitude of the legislature from time to time—the legislature which under the existing system of franchise is bound to be dominated by one or other community in the provinces, and wholly and permanently by a single community at the centre. Since such a stable executive could not be composed of members belonging to the majority party alone but should necessarily be drawn from all parties or groups, its policy would not be other than the result of a compromise or of an attempt to reconcile different points of view. The general lines of such an agreed policy would have to be laid down by mutual agreement in a Conference of representatives of political organizations of the different communities and that on an all-India basis.

The executive called “Composite Government” of the character adumbrated above is different from the executive called “Coalition Government”. The latter comes into existence where there is a plurality of parties or groups, none of which nor two or more of which, command an absolute majority. Such a contingency is not possible under circumstances that can be envisaged at present. In most provincial legislatures we have but a big party which represents only the majority community. It is only when there is a split in the big party that coalition comes in as in Bengal, where the Muslims are divided and where consequently the government is very weak. The Executive of a Coalition Government therefore is always an unstable government, and even when it is reshuffled, it would still be a coalition government. In order therefore that peace and order—the two primary objects of every government—should be maintained effectively, more particu-

larly when there is conflict of interests and cultures between the two leading communities neither of whom is willing to accept the political domination of the other, a composite stable government, such as exists in America and follows an agreed policy, is the only form of government that is likely to arrest the disintegration that has already set in as a result of the Act of 1935. The form of such a composite stable government can be settled between the communities concerned, although as a basis of discussion we have suggested that the Prime Minister in each province should be elected by the entire legislature to function during the lifetime of the legislature itself. He should be free to select his own colleagues on the executive in terms of the ratio to be fixed on an all-India basis by agreement between the communities concerned. The Executive selected by the elected Premier will not be removable by any adverse vote of the legislature and will devote itself exclusively to the welfare of the people by following a policy agreed by the members composing the government.

### SAFEGUARDS

Under the section dealing with safeguards, the proposed transitional constitution has suggested ways and means whereby the interests of the Muslims, as well as of other minorities, may adequately be safeguarded both in legislation and administration; and they are so self-explanatory that they need not be discussed here at any length.

The scheme which follows is given in the form in which it was prepared for the consideration of the All-India Muslim League.

### 2.

### OUTLINE OF ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTION

The transitional constitution for India will have to fit into the conception of the ultimate federation and must lead to it. This will necessitate the creation of certain new Provinces on cultural or linguistic lines *without involving immediate exchange of population*. The new Provinces may

be constituted even piecemeal, but one of them, at any rate, should be carved immediately out of the present United Provinces. It should be formed with a view to resolving it eventually into a Muslim zone, and a permanent home for all the Muslims living at present in U. P. and Bihar.

## TRANSITIONAL FEDERATION

It is for the "Constitutional" lawyers to work out the details of the transitional constitution, but any such constitution should embody the following provisions:

1. In the Preamble, it must be clearly brought out that the aim of the transitional federal constitution laid down is to lead India to a federation of culturally homogeneous states.

2. *Legislation.*—(a) The Federal Legislative List should be reduced to a minimum number of items and be confined only to subjects which concern the common political and economic interests of India as a whole.

- (b) All other subjects should form the Provincial list subject to the following proviso :

## REGIONAL BOARDS

There may be subjects of cultural and economic importance common to contiguous federal units and it will be found useful to have for them Regional or Zonal Boards to evolve common policies, leaving the individual federal units to legislate in the light of the common policies so evolved.

Three of the zones may be constituted as follows :

1. North-West Zone composed of Sind, Baluchistan, N.-W.F.P., Kashmir, Khairpur, and the Indian States of the Punjab Agency.

2. North-East Zone composed of Bengal and Assam.

3. The Dominions of Hyderabad.

The rest of India may be resolved into linguistic zones even as the Congress may wish.

The above arrangement has two advantages :

- (i) It will remove Cultural Legislation from federal control.
- (ii) It will develop a zonal or regional sense necessary to evolve culturally autonomous states, which the transitional constitution is to lead to.

## SAFEGUARDS FOR MUSLIMS

Whatever be the nature of the transitional federal constitution, whether consisting of newly formed units as suggested above or of units in their existing form, the Muslims will need the undermentioned safeguards to be incorporated in the Constitution.

### A.—REPRESENTATION ON LEGISLATURE

1. The system of separate electorates for Muslims should be maintained, as well as the existing proportion of Muslims in the several Legislatures.

2. The inclusion of the Indian States in an All-India Federation should be made dependent upon their returning to the Central Legislatures a sufficient quota of Muslims so as to allow to their community, in view of their political importance, and particularly of their predominant share in the defence of the country, *at least* a third of the seats at the Centre.

3. If the proposed Zonal or Regional Boards are established, the Muslims should be allowed adequate and effective representation commensurate with their total strength in the Legislatures of the several units composing each zone.

### B.—LEGISLATION

All subjects touching their religion, personal law and culture will be the exclusive concern of the Muslim members of the Legislature concerned, constituted into a Special Committee for the purpose. The strength of the committee should be augmented by a third by co-opting representa-

tive Muslims, learned in Muslim Law and Religion. The decisions of such a Committee should be accepted by the whole Legislature. If such decisions, should they seem to affect the interests of other communities, might on reference made by the head of the Administration be reviewed by the Legislature as a whole, but no amendments shall be permissible which should affect the basis of the legislative enactment.

### C.—EXECUTIVE

The Executive Government of the Ministers in each province or at the centre should not be drawn from the majority party alone as is the vogue in homogeneous democratic countries like England. Here in India, it is the majority community which permanently returns the majority of members to the Legislature and, inasmuch as the majority community, namely, the Hindus, unfortunately differ from the Muslims, the next largest community in the country, in almost every detail of domestic and social life, the governance of the country by a permanent majority in the Legislature resolves itself into the governance of the country by the majority community only, and cannot be expected to be a Government of the whole people.

The executive that needs to be chosen for every province and the centre should, in the present stage, be a *composite executive* representing Hindus and Muslims with an agreed policy acceptable to both, and not liable to be turned out by the Legislature. That should be the arrangement, at any rate, until India resolves itself into a federation of culturally autonomous states, when alone true democracy may take its birth in the country, and responsible Government justified.

Under the transitional constitution, therefore, the Executive should be not a "parliamentary executive in the English sense, but a "stable executive" independent of the Legislature as in the great democracy of the United States of America but the Prime Minister instead of being elected directly by the people as the President in U.S.A., should be elected by the entire Legislature, and should remain in office during the

life of the legislature, and will not be removable by it. He will choose his colleagues or ministers in the interests of good government from the members of all groups in the legislature, an equitable number of whom should be Muslims enjoying the confidence of the Muslim members of the legislature concerned and should be selected from a panel suggested by them.

2. Of the two provinces into which U. P. will be divided the Prime Minister for the Muslim province should be a Muslim, as this area will have in the transitional period to prepare itself to resolve into a Muslim zone, and will have its policy to be directed by a Muslim.

3. In the case of the portfolios affecting Law and Order and Education which have to deal with problems over which cultural differences arise, provision should be made to have a Minister and an Assistant Minister and to appoint a Muslim to either of the two posts, in order that the Government may have the benefit of his steadying influence.

#### D.—PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

It should be provided in the Constitution that in all provinces where the Muslims are in a minority and at the centre, one at least of the members of the Public Service Commission should be a Muslim, part of whose duty shall be to see that the ratio fixed for the Muslims in public services is properly adhered to in practice by the Government concerned.

#### E.—JUDICIARY

The Personal Law of the Muslims should be administered by Muslim Judges.

#### F.—MUSLIM BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC UPLIFT

It should be provided in the constitution that in each provincial unit a Muslim Board should be established to control and supervise the cultural side of the education of Muslims, their technical and industrial training, and to



devise measures for their economic and social uplift. For this purpose, a proper budgetary provision shall be made.

### G.—SPECIAL TAXATION

If for any special object, the Muslims are willing to tax themselves, the necessary legislation should be passed.

### MACHINERY TO EFFECT EXCHANGE OF POPULATION

One of the objects of the transitional constitution is to facilitate and prepare the ground for the migration of Muslims and the Hindus into the zones specified for them so as to develop them into culturally homogeneous states. During the transitional period migration should be on a voluntary basis. For this the necessary legislation will have to be passed for each region, and a machinery set up to organize and regulate this voluntary migration. The proposed constitution will therefore have to provide for the appointment of a Royal Commission to lay down a suitable programme of gradual exchange of population.

The result of voluntary migration may be reviewed from time to time and if it should be found that it has eliminated the cultural clashes between the Muslims and the Hindus to an appreciable extent and given them a sense of security wherever they need it, or has brought about a change of heart in either camp, the question of compulsory migration may be put off indefinitely, and the voluntary method adhered to for a further term.

SYED ABDUL LATIF.

*Hyderabad-Deccan,*  
*April 1939.*

## SECTION I

*Correspondence with Dr. Rajendra Prasad and  
Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru*

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ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE

*Sadaquat Ashram,  
P. O. Dighaghat, Patna,  
15th November, 1939.*

Dear Sir,

I shall be obliged if you kindly send me a copy of the undermentioned pamphlet to the address given above. In case the pamphlet is sold for a price it may be sent by V.P. Post or by ordinary post with a bill the amount of which will be remitted as soon as the bill is received.

Hoping to be excused for the trouble,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD,  
*President.*

Name of the pamphlet:—

*The Cultural Future of India.*

*Dr. Syed Abdul Latif,  
Vice-President,  
Hyderabad Academy,  
Hyderabad-Deccan.*

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Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Dn.,  
27th November, 1939.

Dear Doctor Sahib,

Having been out of station, I could open your kind letter of the 15th instant only to-day ; and I hasten to dispatch to you by this mail a copy of *The Cultural Future of India* which you have asked for.

Along with this, I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy of *The Muslim Problem in India* in which the subject of the *Cultural Future of India* is more fully discussed. In fact, it is a supplementary study offering an outline of an alternative constitution for India, which though originally prepared for the consideration of the Muslim League some eight months ago, was eventually meant for the consideration of the Congress as well.

I am not a politician in any sense of the term, and possess no credentials to speak for any particular political party in the country. The views which I have advanced therefore are to be taken as the views of one who in his own way and from a detached station has felt deeply over the dissensions which prevail among us and would like to terminate them even by drastic means, if necessary. The plan for a federation of culturally homogeneous states is a plan for a lasting political unity of the country and not for disruption. You may not share that ideal, nor admit the background against which it is set ; but the alternative constitution suggested as an escape from the present impasse, with its emphasis on a composite executive at the Centre as also in the Provinces, may deserve your kind and earnest consideration even

without any reference to the ideal—an ideal conceived more in sorrow than in any wilful wish. After all, this is an individual opinion and is not intended to come in the way of any better solution that may be thought of as the result of your negotiations with the League. My only prayers are that Hindus and Muslims may enter upon a period of truly happy relations; for then, no one can or dare deny independence to our country.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Dr. Rajendra Prasad,*  
*President,*  
*All-India Congress Committee,*  
*Sadaquat Ashram,*  
*P. O. Dighaghat, Patna.*

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#### ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE

*Sadaquat Ashram,*  
*P. O. Dighaghat, Patna,*  
*30th November, 1939.*

Dear Doctor Latif Sahib,

I thank you for kindly sending me the two pamphlets and for the letter which have all reached me to-day. As I have been interesting myself in the problem and was anxious to get the views of those who have devoted thought and time to the question, I took the liberty of asking for a copy of your pamphlet. I have not yet been able to look into the books. You may rest assured that I am going to study them with an open mind and with a wish to understand not only the plan adumbrated but also the

background in a spirit of understanding and sympathy. After studying the books if I find that there is any point which requires further elucidation I shall once again take the liberty of addressing you and I am assured that you will not mind such intrusion.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD.

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ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE  
SWARAJ BHAWAN, ALLAHABAD

*Camp—Bajajwadi, Wardha,  
January 2nd, 1940.*

My dear Dr. Latif,

I have been studying your *Muslim Problem in India*, which you were good enough to send me some time back. In order to understand the full significance and the implications of the scheme of cultural distribution, I shall be obliged if you kindly furnish me with some more details regarding the points mentioned below :

1. Do you include whole of the Punjab as at present constituted in the N. W. Block, or do you exclude any portion of it ? It is not quite clear what are the areas, which are to be excluded from the N. W. Block and what the areas and population of the excluded portions will be.
2. What are the districts of Bengal, which you exclude from the N. E. Muslim Block ?

3. What are the districts or states which will constitute the Delhi-Lucknow Block? What would be their area and how is the number of 12 millions of Musalmans to be settled in it calculated? It seems that you include in it the cities of Delhi, Agra, Cawnpore and Lucknow.
4. Am I right in understanding that in the Deccan Block, you include the whole of the Nizam's State and Berar? What would be the area of the strip of territory, running through the districts of Kurnool, Cuddapa, Chittor, N. Arcot, and Chingalput down to the city of Madras and what is the existing population of the area to be so joined to the 4th Block?

After the exchange of population, when it is completed, what do you contemplate to be the area and the population of each block, whether Hindu or Muslim? I am, of course, assuming that there would be no Muslim in any Hindu area and no Hindu or Sikh in any Muslim area.

5. Another question, which has not been, as far as I am able to see, discussed, is the question of cost of transfer of populations. In framing the scheme, you must have taken all this into consideration and I should like to be enlightened on the estimated cost of transfer. Other questions, which arise in this connection are :

(a) Is the emigrant to be paid anything

beyond the cost of transport? It is assumed that he will carry with him all his movables and will be provided with land in the block, to which he is transferred. Will he be compensated for the immovables, which he will leave behind?

- (b) Who will pay the cost? the block to which he is transferred or the block from which he goes or both—and if the last, in what proportion?
6. After once the different blocks have been constituted, will Hindus be permitted to go and settle in Muslim blocks and carry on business and *vice-versa*? Will Muslims be permitted to have purely religious propaganda for conversion purposes in Hindu regions or not and *vice-versa*?
7. It seems that you have allowed the Harijans to remain where they like whether in the Hindu zones or Muslim regions. Does it mean that you treat them as non-Hindus? In giving the figures of population I shall ask for separate figures for Muslims and Harijans, whom you permit to remain in Muslim zones.

So far as the areas and population are concerned I could perhaps work them out myself, if exact description of the blocks in detail is available, but, I believe, you must have got them out in framing the scheme. I should be obliged if you could supply me the information and save me the trouble of working

them out. As I am at present engaged in studying your scheme along with other schemes of a similar kind, I have taken the liberty to write to you for additional information, so that I may form correct opinion on and understand, as I have said, all the implications of the scheme.

I am staying here at Wardha till about the 15th of this month and I shall be obliged for your reply here.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD.

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
5th January, 1940.*

My dear Doctor Sahib,

Thanks for your kind letter of the 2nd instant. I shall reply to it while you are still in Wardha.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Dr. Rajendra Prasad,  
President,  
All-India Congress Committee,  
Camp-Bajajwadi, Wardha.*

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*Anand Bhawan, Allahabad,  
25th December, 1939.*

Dear Dr. Latif,

I am grateful to you for sending me your book—*The Muslim Problem in India*. I have read this book with interest and have tried to understand your



argument. I am afraid I am wholly unable to appreciate it. You say in your letter that you are not a politician but you have written as a politician, and accepted as facts many assertions which have yet to be proved.

With much that you say regarding the background, I might agree and yet the inferences you draw do not seem to be justified. The background is important but still more important is the future for which we build. It is not clear in your essay what political or economic structure you are ultimately aiming at. And, as you know, economics to-day governs politics. The fundamental problem of India to-day is not political but one of poverty and unemployment and low production and vested interests, both foreign and Indian which prevent progress. There is nothing in your essay which touches these problems. You seem to take it for granted that the British imperial domination should continue, though it may function less than it has done in the past. Apparently you take for granted a continued existence of the Indian States as they are.

I proceed from different premises completely. Historically speaking, the Indian States are complete anachronisms in the world to-day. As you know, similar political entities in Europe and elsewhere ceased to exist long ago. The Indian States represent a feudal regime which cannot be reconciled with greater production and juster distribution. A feudal regime is wholly inconsistent with any type of democracy or even with capitalism in its modern form, much less with more socially advanced forms. British

imperialism is an effective barrier to economic growth in India, apart from its political consequences.

You have criticised Hinduism as opposed to democracy. Your criticism is largely justified in so far as the organisation of Hindu society is concerned. The social ideal behind Islamic society has been more democratic. But politically Islamic States have been in the past feudal autocracies which had nothing to do with democracy. Where democracy is creeping into the Islamic States, it is on the basis of modern scientific political theory which separates the State from religion, though keeping religion intact for the individual and the group. Turkey is an outstanding example of an Islamic State which has deliberately ceased to call itself Islamic as such. The same tendency is visible in the other Islamic countries more or less.

A parallel to all this can be found in Europe one hundred and fifty years ago or more, when Christendom as a political theory dominated the State, but was gradually separated from the State.

I feel, therefore, that your background is somewhat medieval and does not fit in at all with modern theory or practice, and does not take into consideration the fundamental importance of the economic side.

It seems to me that inevitably both so-called Hindu and so-called Muslim culture will be powerfully shaken and influenced by the scientific culture which has impressed itself on the world to-day. So long as it does not do so we shall remain backward economically and therefore politically and also culturally. In so far as this happens, a certain homogeneity

is produced. This does not mean that the essential traits of our culture, whether Hindu or Muslim, should be suppressed or should disappear. That would be unfortunate and would lead to India becoming culturally a rootless country. I think that India can only progress truly if those roots of real culture are nourished and led to imbibe the culture of modern science. It is essential, therefore, that nothing should be done to suppress these cultural traditions, Hindu or Muslim, though their extravagant and undesirable accrescences might well be done away with. In any event it is highly improper for the Hindus even to attempt to vary any cultural growth of the Muslims, just as it is improper for the Muslims to make a similar attempt in regard to Hindu culture. Healthy changes cannot be imposed from outside but must come from inside the group.

I agree with you, therefore, that the fullest latitude should be allowed to group cultures. I do not see why this should not be done within a frame-work of political unity and freedom.

Your scheme of re-distribution of population and areas in India seems to me somewhat fantastic from the practical point of view, apart from its other features. I do not see any particular difficulty in giving freedom to these group cultures without having the surgical operations that you suggest and which are wholly impracticable. As a matter of fact India, as constituted to-day from the point of view of division of population, provides many balancing factors which go to protect communities and cultures. Personally I would willingly agree to autonomous areas being

carved out of larger provinces so as to give these areas cultural autonomy and a sense of freedom.

The subject is a vast one and can hardly be dealt with in the course of a letter. It seems to me, however, that every approach to it must keep the dominant economic factor in mind—the poverty of India and how to remove it as rapidly as possible. We forget this at our peril. The alternatives that we have to face are : a united democratic India with the fullest protection of cultural rights and the interests of all communities, and an attempt of the Sovietisation of India in order to deal more directly with the poverty problem. I prefer the former.

Please excuse the errors in typing that have crept into this letter. I dictated in a hurry.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

*Dr. Syed Abdul Latif,  
The Hyderabad Academy,  
Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad (Deccan).*

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
10th January, 1940.*

My dear Doctor Sahib,

I take the liberty of enclosing herewith a copy of a letter received from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and a copy of my reply to it. They deal with the subject in respect of which you have asked for elucidation from me. My reply to you will be sent while you

are still at Wardha. The enclosures are intended to clarify the issue, and to avoid repetition in what I shall have to write to you.

With deep regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Dr. Rajendra Prasad,  
President, All-India Congress Committee,  
Camp Bajajwadi, Wardha.*

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
10th January, 1940.*

Dear Panditji,

I am grateful to you for your letter of the 25th December received here while I was at Aundh.

I appreciate your frank criticism of the views I have advanced in *The Muslim Problem in India*. But there are one or two things therein which I am afraid, you have missed. I, too, dislike imperialism. The difference is only this: you pit yourself only against the British imperialism. I disapprove of imperialism in every form, British or Congress, or Muslim or any other. I too want India to remain as a single political entity; but I believe that this is possible only when all the communities feel united in individual security. It is why I am against the Pakistan Movement *as conceived by its original promoters* which in my humble opinion is a separatist movement, and would call for two federations in the country. (*Vide pp. 27-28 of The Muslim Problem in India.*) I am in

favour of a single federation but composed of culturally autonomous states formed through intermigration spread conveniently over a number of years. You are at liberty to call the proposal 'fantastic'; but you will have to move towards it, even as you move towards a fatality, if—mark the condition—you do not attempt seriously at this hour to bring about a lasting settlement of the problem of communities in a less arduous style. The idea of cultural zones is a mild idea compared with that of Pakistan. But that will be thrown into the limbo of oblivion, and the spectre of Pakistan alone will stare you in the face tomorrow, if to-day you fail to use your opportunities to frame a constitution for the country agreeable to all. (*Vide* p. 28, *ibid.*)

As an alternative to the idea of cultural zones, you say that you "would willingly agree to autonomous areas being carved out of larger provinces so as to give these areas cultural autonomy and a sense of freedom." So you agree with the principle of the proposed cultural zones; only, you propose smaller areas. The proposition is worthy of examination. What are the areas you propose in each large province? How would you make them culturally autonomous without some sort of exchange of population? Will they be economically autonomous at the same time? Or what would be their share in the larger economic life of the province concerned or of the country as a whole? The Muslims may very likely take your suggestion as a sort of encirclement. What specific provisions would you make to give them a sense of freedom?

I do not certainly treat lightly of the economic

aspect of the country's future, or of what you unnecessarily style 'scientific culture'. That aspect is implied ; but the Muslims would expect it to harmonize with their own culture. Turkey whom you cite in your favour turned a secular state only after she had got rid of her alien population. So far as I could understand the mind of the Muslim world, it is this : Where the Muslims are in the majority as in most Muslim countries, their politics is their religion ; but where they are in the minority or have to live in the midst of an overwhelming non-Muslim population as in India, their religion or culture is their politics. They assume this attitude because religion with them is a way of living sanctioned by certain truths of life in which they believe, and they therefore let every circumstance subserve it. You know of Islam only in terms of feudalism, of Persianised-cum-Hinduised Islam. That marks a period of neglect and wastage. There is now a new spirit abroad among the Muslims. They are anxious to build their future on their democratic heritage, rather than their feudal, and live in peaceful relations with their neighbours, and thereby promote the united good of the whole country. You can easily negotiate with a people developing such an outlook. No hide and seek policy will bear fruit.

As a possible relief from the present impasse, and a solution to our immediate difficulties outside of the idea of cultural zones, large or small, I had invited your kind consideration to the outline of an alternative constitution given in the last chapter of *The Muslim Problem in India*. You are silent over it. It

is meant to be a stepping stone to full freedom for the whole country and also to democratization of the Indian states on lines of the least resistance. The outline is elastic enough to apply even to Dominion Status which I think is within our easy grasp if only we could settle our differences.

I possess no credentials from any political party ; but judging from the trend, at any rate, of the Muslim mind and of the minds of other minorities, I should hope, that a settlement might be effected if the Congress should allow its thoughts to dwell sympathetically on the proposed outline of a settlement. Even that can be modified, if warranted by mutual sincerities. My impression is that you simply do not know how to enlist the co-operation of Mr. Jinnah. He is as good a patriot as you are, and as sincere in his determination to see India emancipated. But some of you try to baffle him, and he baffles you in return, and we suffer in consequence. Leave aside the idea of the cultural zones—large as I have said, small, as you say ; but concentrate on an alternative, even on the lines, I have suggested, and something may yet turn out to the satisfaction of the country as a whole. Independence you will get,—who does not want independence ?—but it will be dust and ashes without unity. If you do not approve of the lines of rapprochement proposed, suggest something better. But do not pray make much of mere catch-words. They will not help us. You say you would like to see “ a united democratic India with the fullest protection of cultural rights and the interests of all communities ” Show how you would work



this out, and suggest what would secure the fullest protection of cultural rights, and the interests of all communities? I think you will do a great service to India if you should come out with concrete suggestions. The country wants a distinct lead from those who wish to speak for her.

I trust that there is nothing confidential about what you have written or what I have replied. They are stand-points of students, of those who wish to serve a common cause. Dr. Rajendra Prasad has asked for elucidation of certain points connected with the idea of cultural zones. He expects a reply while he is still at Wardha till the 15th instant. Since I have no wish to repeat to him what I have touched upon in this letter, I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this to him along with a copy of your letter. I shall send you a copy of what I reply to his own letter. My idea is to know your combined mind, even as ultimately reviewed by Gandhiji, so that I might feel competent to apprise the Muslim mind of what you think, and even discuss personally the whole subject with Mr. Jinnah. The hour demands pooling together.

With deep regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,  
Anand Bhawan,  
Allahabad.*

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## ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE

*Swaraj Bhawan, Allahabad,  
12th January, 1940,  
Wardha Camp.*

My dear Dr. Latif,

I thank you very much for your letter of the 10th instant and the copy of correspondence that has passed between you and Jawaharlalji. I am awaiting your further communication on the subject.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD.

*Dr. S. A. Latif,  
Yusuf Manzil,  
Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan.*

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
12th January, 1940.*

My dear Doctor Sahib,

Kindly refer to your letter of January 2, regarding the scheme of cultural distribution. My reply as under follows the order in which you have raised your points for elucidation.

## ITEMS No. 1—4

On pages 35-36 of *The Muslim Problem in India*, I have said: "The creation of the above Hindu and Muslim zones should fulfil the political aspirations of every cultural unit, and provide for each a free homeland in proportional extent of the

habitable area to its strength in the total population of India. The demarcation indicated here of the different zones is *merely suggestive in character* and may properly be determined by a Royal Commission appointed for the purpose." When initiating the idea, I could not have gone into minute details. At such a stage, it is the idea which is more important. The details will have to be worked out when the idea is accepted by the parties concerned. This may be done by either a Royal Commission or by a national body working in four Committees, each for one of the four blocks suggested. I have calculated my rough figures for the Muslim blocks on the basis of the last census, and have taken into consideration the probable rise in the Muslim population during the present decade, and the probable strength of the non-Hindu non-Muslims who would continue to remain where they are. I may however make it clear that it is the actual figures that will ultimately determine the demarcation of areas. I may now take up your items seriatim.

### *Item No. 1*

I would concentrate all the Hindu and Sikh population of the N. W. Block minus Sind in the Hindu and Sikh Indian States of the Punjab, and the Jammu portion of the State of the Maharajah of Kashmir and Jammu. The arrangement will necessitate an alteration in the boundaries of that State. The Kashmir or Western portion of the State which is predominantly Muslim in population will need to be transferred to the present Punjab, and by way of compensation, a portion of the British Kangra

Valley contiguous to Jammu added to the Maharajah's territory on the basis of respective land values. The balance, if any, may be adjusted by payment in cash by the government concerned.

The Hindus of Sind can accommodate themselves in the adjoining area of Gujarat and Rajasthan when the Muslim population is shifted from there.

*Item No. 2*

The demarcation of Western Bengal to be assigned to the Hindu Bengalis is a matter of detail.

*Item No. 3*

The demarcation of the Delhi-Lucknow Block is also a matter of detail. But it will have to include the State of Rampur and a contiguous area which should cover Delhi, Agra, Cawnpore and Lucknow, and exclude the Hindu sacred places of Benares, Hardwar, Allahabad and Muttra. The block is intended to accommodate the Muslims of U.P., Behar, and Central Indian Hindu States. The demarcation of the proposed block is a matter of detail. Preparatory to the exchange of population, the British portion of the proposed block should be constituted into a province having for its prime minister a Muslim. (*Vide p. 48.*)

*Item No. 4*

The Deccan Block is indicative of the position where alone concentration of the Muslim population below the Vindhyas and Satpuras could be effected, if we have, at the same time, to allow the Mahrattas,

the Andhras, the Kanaras, the Malayalis and the Tamilians homogeneous states with exclusive boundaries of their own (*vide* pp. 31-32). Madras has been chosen as an outlet to the sea for this block, because any other arrangement would destroy the homogeneity of the Hindu zones just referred to above. The suggested demarcation is based on the assumption that the Harijans of the proposed Muslim block might choose not to shift from where they are, and will, therefore, include the quota of population that will have to be assigned to this block. The actual demarcation is of course a matter of detail and will have to be settled between the Nizam of Hyderabad and the governments of the British areas to be affected.

#### *Items No. 5—7*

##### *Item No. 5—Cost of Transfer of Population*

This is again a matter of detail which will have to be worked out by the Commission or the Committee to be. I may recommend to you the Report of "Commission Mixte Pour L'Exchange Des Populations Crecques Et Turques" 1923 for general guidance. It will give you an idea as to the nature and extent of compensation which will have to be given to migrants for property in all forms left behind by them. It is not necessary that the migrant should carry with him all his movables. Heavy movables such as furniture and cattle may easily be disposed of by him before making a move. The compensation will be permissible only in respect of the immovables such as land and houses, or any legal rights thereto

in any form. In respect of such property, committees jointly approved of by the governments involved will have to be appointed for each village and town, and registers prepared of the different properties with their valuation assessed. The registers of such properties in the blocks concerned will be made accessible to all those affected by the exchange. An agriculturist for instance, leaving a particular block will know what plots of the value of his own leaving behind are available on the other side. Before migrating, he will be given a chance to make his own selection and register his name for the land preferred in a certain order. And for making his choice in person a period of one year will be given to him to visit the place he would like to settle and to register his name for any particular plot of ground he would choose for himself. The bare expenses of his journey to and fro will be met from a common fund pooled, on the strength of a special taxation, by the governments of the two areas concerned. The evacuation will proceed piecemeal, village by village ; so much so, that the process for any single block might even be spread over ten years or even a longer period. While leaving, each migrant would get from his former government a statement to the effect that he was leaving behind property worth so much and in such and such form. The statement or certificate will entitle him on the other side from his new government either the amount in cash or equivalent property as might be decided upon by the migrant.

This in a rough way will be the arrangement to be followed in effecting inter-migration and apportion-

ment of compensation.

*Item No. 6*

I have already indicated my answer to this question in *The Muslim Problem in India*. A Hindu or Muslim, or for the matter of that, even a foreigner will be permitted to take up residence in every block for purposes of business or education and similar objects. But he will be there as a national of the block or country he comes from.

Propaganda for conversion, I would restrict ; but full freedom of conscience would be allowed. If any individual or body of individuals in consequence change their religion, they will be entitled to migrate into a block where they could live with those following their new religion, or allow their citizenship in the original block to be governed by a " Public Law of Indian Nations " enacted for such purpose which should allow them the fullest rights of citizenship.

I would request you to read the 'Safeguards' once again given on pp. 36-37. For the sake of convenience, I reproduce :

Under the proposed order the following provisions will need to be embodied in the Constitution :

*Public Law of Indian Nations.*—(1) Individuals belonging to one or other of the several nationalities may for special purposes, live in zones to which they do not culturally belong. Such individuals will be afforded security of person and right of citizenship under a 'Public Law of Indian Nations' to be adopted by the Central Government.

*Religious Shrines, etc.*—(2) All religious shrines, monuments and grave-yards belonging to the Hindus or

the Muslims and left behind by either will be preserved and looked after by each federal state under the supervision of the Central Government.

*Christians, Parsis, Buddhists, etc.*—(3) The smaller nationalities such as the Christians or Anglo-Indians, Parsis and Budhists will be afforded by each state, Muslim or Hindu, all the necessary religious or cultural safeguards which they might need to preserve their individuality. They will at the same time have the right to ask for a cantonal life for themselves, if they should desire it at any time.

*Harijans.*—(4) The various depressed classes and untouchables, styled Harijans, dispersed as they are all over the country and forming countless racial varieties and possessing no common culture between them, and being mostly landless, will be given perfect liberty to choose the Hindu or Muslim zones to form their permanent homelands where they will enjoy the fullest right of citizenship, even as the Christians or Anglo-Indians, Buddhists and Parsis.

#### *Item No. 7.*

I have allowed the Harijans to remain where they like. They are mostly a landless class and raise no serious question of compensation. My impression is that those living in areas to be reserved for Muslims may not find it profitable to shift along with the Caste Hindus.

I have no right to call them either Hindus or non-Hindus. They will have to determine which they are.

If they, as a body, wish to leave the blocks allotted to the Muslims, I should certainly raise no objection. Similarly, if they wish to stay where they are, I would let them do so. Indeed I would give them a per-



manent interest in the land under some equitable distribution of the landed wealth of the block concerned.

I think I have answered all your points. If there is anything further that I may do, I am always at your service.

But I ask : why do you grow so pessimistic ? Is our statesmanship so poor as to think only of what I consider a fatality. Can we not live together as we are on a humanistic basis agreeable to both of us ? Will you be happy without me or I without you ? Gandhiji having read *The Muslim Problem in India* writes to me :

There are such fundamental differences between us that argument becomes useless. God will dispose of us and decide what is good for us.

He has despaired too soon. Tell him that we can create our own fates. They are not superimposed, at all events, in such affairs. We perish by our own hands. And I do not wish either you or me to perish. Think of some suitable constitution for our country to be devised by easy means, a constitution which will give both of us equal freedom.

With deep regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Dr. Rajendra Prasad,*  
*President, All-India Congress Committee,*  
*Camp—Bajajwadi, Wardha.*

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Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
13th January, 1940.

Dear Panditji,

I enclose herewith as promised a copy of Dr. Rajendra Prasad's letter dated January 2nd, and a copy of my reply to him dated the 12th January.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,  
Anand Bhawan,  
Allahabad.*

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*Anand Bhawan,  
Allahabad,  
6th March, 1940.*

Dear Dr. Latif,

I must apologise for the delay in acknowledging receipt of your letter of the 10th January and for the copy of your letter sent to Dr. Rajender Prasad. You will appreciate and understand the causes of this delay. We have to face a critical situation and the future is dark with uncertainty.

I fear that your approach to the Hindu-Muslim question is so entirely different from mine that I find it difficult to see any reality behind your proposals. That makes it difficult also to discuss them with any profit to you or me. The whole tendency in the world to-day is for inter-dependence—economically, scienti-

fically, commercially, financially, artistically and even culturally. Politically the tendency is there also but there are powerful factors both in the political and economic field which come in the way of modern growth.

Your proposals seem to me opposed to this world tendency and are therefore reactionary. They proceed from a static conception of society which is singularly out of keeping with the modern dynamic age. In trying to solve one problem, rather superficially, they produce any number of additional problems and in fact aggravate and perpetuate the very problems that they intended to solve.

I am entirely in favour of all real cultural strands in a people to be protected and given full freedom of growth. Indeed it is essential for advancement that every individual and group should have a sense of freedom and liberty and that all repressions should be removed. Those repressions may be political, economic or cultural. I do not think your way is the way to remove these repressions or to tone down the conflicts that exist

So far as I am concerned, there is nothing confidential in what I have written to you.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

*Dr. S. A. Latif,  
Yusuf Manzil,  
Hyderabad-Deccan.*

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad Deccan,  
16th March, 1940.*

Dear Jawaharlalji,

I have received your kind letter. One day I hope to meet you and settle our differences. So far as you and I are concerned, the differences seem to be merely psychological. In spirit, you and I are one. That is the impression I have gathered from your correspondence, whatever you might say.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,  
Anand Bhawan,  
Allahabad.*

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TELEGRAM

*Dated 9th March, 1940.*

Dr. Rajendra Prasad,  
Sadaquat Ashram,  
P. O. Dighaghat, Patna.

Could you permit issuing correspondence between you, Jawaharlalji and me as supplement to my *Muslim Problem in India*.

DR. LATIF, *Adikmet.*

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## REPLY

*Dated 12th March, 1940.*

Dr. Latif,  
Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan.

Have no objection publication my letter. Consult Nehruji for his.

RAJENDRAPRASAD.

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## TELEGRAM

*Dated 12th March 1940.*

Jawaharlalji,  
Anandbhawan, Allahabad.

Could you permit issuing correspondence with you as supplement to my *Muslim Problem in India*.

LATIF.

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## REPLY

*Dated 12th March, 1940.*

Dr. Latif,  
Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan.

Certainly you can issue our correspondence.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

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## SECTION II

### *Constituent Assembly*

[While the correspondence with the Congress leaders given in Section I was being carried on, the author was invited by the All-India Council of the International Fellowship to attend its Seventh biennial Conference held from the 27th to 31st December 1939 at Aundh under the auspices of His Highness the Raja Saheb of Aundh, and to read a paper before it on "The Problem of Communal Relations in India." The paper read there is given here *in extenso*. The Conference was held under the presidency of Professor P. A. Wadia of Bombay and was attended by representatives from every part of the country including a number of British and American social workers. The majority of the delegates were pro-Congress in their views. The resolution on the communal problem, as amended by the author and unanimously adopted, discountenanced the Congress idea of entrusting the task of framing a constitution for India to a Constituent Assembly and recommended instead that it should be discharged by a small Representative body. This resolution is given at the end of the Section. This was a point gained in favour of the Muslim League.]

### THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM IN INDIA

The communal problem in India cannot be properly appreciated except in its relation to its religious background ; and that background our learned friend, Mr. Chenchiah has already analysed for us with remarkable clearness in the paper which he has read

before us ; and if you will grasp this background in the light of what I have myself supplied in my pamphlet, *The Muslim Problem in India*, copies of which have already been placed in your hands, you have all that I would have had to say by way of introduction to what I now propose to place before you for consideration.

You might have noticed that *The Muslim Problem in India* envisages the establishment in this country of a federation of culturally homogeneous states, as a lasting solution to the communal problem. That is an ideal or rather a fatality towards which India will move, if the communal problem is not solved in proper time in a less arduous style. This idea of cultural zones, I may state, is conceived more in sorrow than in any wilful wish, and is to serve as a solution only when every attempt at reconciliation, in any other manner, fails. I am making this point clear to you at the very outset, because you must have noticed that the idea has caught the imagination of the Muslim intelligentsia all over the country and is now no longer considered even by its critics to be a mere dream-fantasy. But I may assure you that that is a misfortune for which a Muslim will work only to avoid a more serious misfortune, if and only if any better solution is not possible for us at the present moment.

I believe that a lasting reconciliation is possible if some sort of arrangement is agreed to at present on the lines indicated in Chapter VIII of *The Muslim Problem in India*, in which I have given an outline of an alternative constitution for India ; and I pray you

to consider that outline without any reference either to the zonal, ideal or the background against which it is set. It rests on the idea that if India is to express its nationhood, it can do so only in the form of a federation of communities and that the only type of government that might keep them all together can only be a government composite in character following an agreed policy.

I am not asking you to consider all the proposals that I have suggested in that Chapter. Many of them are matters of detail which will need to be thrashed out by those who might be called upon to frame a constitution for India. But the governing idea therein of a composite government is worthy of your earnest consideration. It is now nearly eight months since it was placed before the Muslim League under circumstances explained in the introduction to the pamphlet. But that very idea, as I see, has been working independently in the minds of such earnest patriots as Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar and Dr. C. Ramalinga Reddy and others. I wish you would give a further momentum to it and help the country.

And why do I make that request? The Congress High Command wishes to treat India as a homogeneous community and favours a parliamentary system of government for the country modelled on that of England. On the other hand, I believe that there is no solution to our difficulties, unless we resolve India into a federation of communities, each entering into a lasting partnership on terms of equality. Unless you approach the communal problem from this standpoint, which I fancy is realistic,



you will always fail to arrive at a solution agreeable to the minorities. That is the first proposition which I wish you to think over while you are here at Aundh.

I know that this Conference is not in a position to deliver the goods, or speak with any authority except that of reason. We can at best offer a helpful suggestion to our politicians. But let that suggestion be endorsed by the hard facts of life such as we can notice with open eyes. This is a country where mere arithmetic or counting of heads will not take us very far. It is a country of communities, and you cannot talk of welding them into a nation unless you allow to each community the necessary sense of security and an urge for co-operation with every other. If the country, both at the Centre and in the constituent territorial units, can have for its government, a body of people who enjoy the confidence of the people as a whole, I mean all the communities, the minor issues of life such as the playing of music before places of worship, the use of animals for sacrificial purposes, the distribution of the loaves and fishes of office will automatically be settled in a spirit of accommodation. The primary need, therefore, as it appears to me, is to give to the country a system of administration which will allow none to gain an upper hand over the other, and yet afford them all every moral urge to care for each other and to work together for the lasting good of their common motherland. If we from this quiet and detached station can suggest what this system is to be like, I hope, we will be helping those who are in the thick of the

fight over the issue, and cannot unfortunately take a dispassionate view of it.

The Congress has suggested that this should be done by a Constituent Assembly. It is for you to suggest whether that is a workable proposition. The suggestion has been made that a few representatives from every party or a body of experts should combine and design a Constitution for India. Gandhiji says that he cannot trust such a body, and asks "who is to certify to their wisdom." That is not a happy approach to a grave problem. May you suggest what you think is the sensible method of determining the procedure for drafting a constitution for our country. That is the second main proposition which I put forward for your earnest consideration.

At a time such as this, I wish we had a national organization truly representative of all the constituent communities. There would then have been no difficulty in framing an agreed constitution for our country, a constitution such as would signify the independence that it so sorely needs. In the absence of one, it will be our misfortune to recognize the existing political parties in the country for what they stand for, and suggest some *modus operandi* between them, such as might allow the formation of a representative body who could be entrusted with the task of framing a constitution for India agreeable to all the parties concerned including the Indian States.

I do not think I should suggest to you any further issue for consideration. Every other possible issue is in my opinion covered by the two which I have presented before you. To repeat, one is : what type of

government will give the necessary sense of security to every constituent unit in a federation of communities in which form alone India can live as a nation? The other is : what machinery is to be set up to determine a constitution for our country at a time and in the circumstances, such as the present?

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[Immediately following the reading of the paper, there was a general discussion on the points raised, mainly for elucidation. After this, the whole Conference was divided into six groups of 8 to 12 members each, each group having a Convener and a Secretary. The Conveners, Secretaries and the person who introduced the subject and the Chairman of the Conference met together and formulated questions for the consideration of the various groups. Each group discussed the questions thus prepared and afterwards the findings of the Groups were presented to a plenary session of the Conference for further consideration].

The following resolution was then moved by Dr. S. A. Latif and unanimously passed by the Conference :

Having regard to the Communal misunderstanding prevailing in the country at the present moment and the imperative need to bring about a rapprochement between the different communities, this Conference of the International Fellowship assembled at Aundh earnestly appeals to the leaders of the various communities in India to come together in a spirit of mutual trust and good-will without letting any question of

prestige or previous commitments come in the way ; and suggests by way of a solution that a new Constitution acceptable to the people as a whole should be framed without loss of time, and that the task of framing such a Constitution be entrusted to a small representative body.

## SECTION III

### *Correspondence with Mr. M. A. Jinnah on Implications of Lahore Resolution.*

[The second stage in the author's attempt to influence the Congress mind to think of a constitutional solution agreeable to Muslims came when the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League was passed in March 1940. Of the four Zones which he had recommended for gradual development into culturally autonomous sovereign States linked organically to the rest of India, the League at this session concentrated on but two of them. It dispensed with the idea of intermigration and insisted that areas predominantly populated by Muslims should be declared independent. This was a set-back to his ideal. Yet, the author tried to set the League's plan against an All-India background. The revised outline of his original alternative constitution is reproduced here, as that formed the subject of study by certain prominent Congress leaders and the subject of reference in the author's correspondence with Mr. M. A. Jinnah. The Lahore Resolution is also reproduced.]

*Text of Resolution No. 1 on future constitution of India passed at the 27th annual session of the All-India Muslim League held at Lahore on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of March 1940.*

(1) While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this

Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

(2) It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October, 1939, made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests, and communities in India. Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

(3) Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, *viz.*, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative, and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specially provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This Session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.

## A BROAD OUTLINE OF THE UNION OR COMMONWEALTH OF INDIA

The following is a broad outline of the Union or Commonwealth of India as suggested by the author and revised in the light of the Lahore Resolution :

Whatever the status India might achieve in the near future, whether ' Dominion Status ' or ' Complete or Full Independence,' it will be in her best interests that she should resolve herself into a Union with a federal form of constitution peculiar to Indian conditions.

The proposed Union should be composed of sovereign states falling under two categories :

- (1) States carved out of the territory known at present as British India.
- (2) States at present governed by Indian Princes.

### BRITISH INDIA

The states coming under the first category should each be so constituted through a readjustment of existing provincial boundaries as to form a compact block affording absolute cultural homogeneity to the majority community inhabiting the areas and cultural autonomy to the minority communities wherever

necessary. Each such state may consist of several units, each administratively autonomous, but forming together a zonal federation fitting into an all-India Union. For instance, the portions of the British territory or linguistic areas known as Tamil Nad, Andhra, Malabar and Canara may choose either to remain as separate sovereign federated states or combine to form a zonal federation of Dravidian races or cultures linked to a common centre for the whole of India.

Following this principle, and in view particularly of the political aspirations of the Muslims in the North-West and North-East of India, two of the sovereign states should be formed as under :

- (a) A zonal federation composed of Sind, British Baluchistan, N.-W. F. P., and the Punjab.
  - (b) A zonal federation composed of Bengal and Assam.
- (N. B.—These two states will be federations with each constituent unit thereof being autonomous.)

#### INDIAN STATES

The larger Indian states governed by Princes will remain sovereign states and join the Union in their individual rights ; whereas the small ones will either coalesce with contiguous states in British India or group themselves together for purposes of representation at the Centre though individually enjoying autonomy in internal affairs.



## RELATION BETWEEN PROPOSED STATES AND THE CENTRE

*Centre*

1. The central or federal list of subjects will be limited to the barest minimum, such as (a) External Relation, (b) Defence, (c) Major Communications and (d) Customs, etc., subject to the following proviso in respect of Defence :

(a) Each state shall maintain an army at its own expense, the strength of which will be dependent on the importance of its strategic position and specified in the constitution. Part of this army will be classed as 'Federal'. The Centre will share the military expenditure of each state according to the strength of the army maintained. In normal times the military force in each state will be controlled by its own military department, and supervised by the Centre. But in times of war, full control will be assumed by the centre. Each state will have the right to enlist its forces from its own population.

(b) The Navy will be entirely under the control of the centre subject to such concessions as the coastal states might need.

*Residuary Powers*

2. The federated states or units shall be fully autonomous and shall exercise all residuary powers including the right of entering into commercial treaties with foreign powers without prejudice to the

commercial interests of the other federated states of the Indian Union or Commonwealth, and also the right of secession.

### *Federal Finance*

The federal finance will consist of the resources available to the centre in respect of the subjects assigned to it plus contribution from federated states in times of war. ■

### *Safeguards in units for Minorities*

The safeguards mentioned below shall be applicable to Muslim and Hindu minorities. But special safeguards shall be provided for other or smaller minorities in accordance with their cultural and economic needs.

## A.—REPRESENTATION ON LEGISLATURE

### *Units*

1. The Hindus and the Muslims wherever they are in the minority, as well as other minorities, shall be allowed the *option* of being returned to the Legislature of federated states through their own electorates.

2. In every federated state or constituent unit thereof whoever be in the minority, Muslims or Hindus, and whose percentage in population falls short of 33 shall have one-third of the seats in its legislature.

### *Centre*

3. In the Central Legislature, the Muslims, in view of their inevitable share in the defence of India particularly on the North-West and North-East, and

of the fact that Defence is the main function of the Centre, as also in view of the fact that the Muslims are averse to the idea of being dominated at the Centre by the Hindus, shall have at least two-fifths of the seats reserved for them. The Muslim members shall be elected by the Muslim members of the Legislatures of the federated states forming together an electoral college for the purpose.

#### B.—EXECUTIVE AND REPRESENTATION THEREON

##### *Executive*

1. The Executive at the Centre and in each federated state and its constituent units, if any, should be composite in character and follow an agreed policy. The head of the cabinet shall in the interests of efficient administration, have the power to select some of his colleagues from outside the legislature who may be regarded by him as specially qualified by their experience and knowledge for particular portfolios, but who may not choose to bear the ordeal of an election to the legislature. Members of the Executive shall be ex-officio members of the Legislature. They shall be selected by the head of the Cabinet from a panel suggested by the leader of the different communities in the Legislature. The panel may include names of persons outside of the Legislature. The office of the head of the Cabinet shall rotate between Muslims and Hindus. No decision of the cabinet shall be valid if it contravenes the policy agreed to by the composite executive at the time of its formation, or is opposed by the Muslim quota.

2. In the case of the portfolios in federated states or units thereof, if any, affecting Law and Order and Education which have to deal with problems over which cultural differences arise, provision should be made to have a Minister and an Assistant Minister and to appoint a Muslim or Hindu who might be in the minority to either of the two posts, in order that Government might have the benefit of his steady influence.

*Representation on the Executive*

3. For reason applicable to representation on Legislature,

- (a) One-third of the seats on the Executive of federated states and units thereof, if any, should be assigned to Hindus or Muslims whoever might form the minority, and
- (b) Two-fifths of the seats on the Executive at the Centre should be assigned to Muslims.

C.—LEGISLATION

*Units*

1. All subjects touching the religion, personal law and culture of the Hindu or Muslim minorities in any federated state or a constituent unit thereof if any, shall be the exclusive concern of the Muslim or Hindu members of the Legislature concerned, constituted into a special committee for the purpose. The decisions of such a committee should be accepted by the whole legislature. If such decisions, should they seem to affect the interests of others, might on reference made by the head of the Administration

be reviewed by the Legislature as a whole, but no amendments shall be permissible which affects the basis of the proposed legislative enactment.

2. If, for any special object, the Muslims or Hindus or any others are willing to *tax themselves* (e.g., Zakat for Muslims), the necessary legislation shall be passed.

3. No piece of legislation shall be enacted if it contravenes the policy agreed to by the composite Executive at the time of its formation, or if four-fifths of the Muslim or Hindu quota oppose it on the ground of its being prejudicial to their interests.

#### Centre

4. The safeguard provided for units in clause C-3 *supra* shall be equally applicable to legislation at the Centre.

#### D.—PUBLIC SERVICES

It should be provided in the constitution that both at the Centre and in the federated states and in units thereof, if any, one at least of the members of the Public Service Commission should be from the minority community, Hindu or Muslim, as the case might be, part of whose duty shall be to see that the proportion fixed for his community in all ranks of the public services is strictly adhered to in practice by the Government concerned.

#### E.—BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC UPLIFT

##### IN UNITS

It should be provided in the constitution that wherever demanded in the federated states and in

units thereof, if any, an Education Board, Hindu or Muslim, should be established to control and supervise the cultural side of the education of Muslims or Hindus, whoever might form the minority in the state, or unit, and also their technical and industrial training, and to devise measures for their economic and social uplift. For this purpose a proper budgetary provision shall be made. Similar provisions shall also be made for other minorities wherever demanded, e.g., Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, the Depressed Classes, Parsis and Sikhs.

#### VOLUNTARY INTER-MIGRATION

One of the objects of the Constitution shall be to facilitate inter-migration of Muslims and Hindus wherever sought or wherever necessary, between states or between parts of the same state so as to promote a sense of security among them. For this the necessary legislation shall be passed for each state, and a machinery set up to organise and regulate such migration, and assign compensation for property in all forms left behind by migrants.

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*Letter to Dr. Syed Abdul Latif by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Member of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress*

*Red Hills,  
Hyderabad.*

*9th October, 1940.*

My dear Latif,

As you are aware your cultural 'zones' scheme together with the alternative Constitution suggested

by you have received careful attention from some prominent Congress leaders. Should further elucidation be necessary in regard to a few points in your Constitution, would it be possible for you to meet one or two leading members of the Working Committee for personal discussions. It would be, of course, purely in your individual capacity as author of the scheme and Constitution without prejudice, and for the purpose of clarification of issues that might lead to an agreed solution.

As I am leaving tomorrow night (the 10th) for Wardha please send me an immediate reply.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) SAROJINI NAIDU.

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### TELEGRAM

*Dated 9-10-40.*

M. A. Jinnah, Esquire,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay.

Mrs. Sarojini Naidu writes me asking immediate reply. Letter begins :

"As you are aware your cultural zones scheme together Alternative Constitution suggested by you have received careful attention from some prominent Congress leaders (stop) Should further elucidation be necessary regard few points in your Constitution would it be possible for you meet leading Members Working Committee for personal discussion (stop) It would be of course purely in your individual capacity as Author Scheme and Constitution without

prejudice and for purpose elucidation of issues that might lead to an agreed solution (stop) As I am leaving tomorrow night tenth for Wardha please send me immediate reply (stop) Letter ends. Kindly wire if you have any objection my meeting Congress Leaders personal capacity for elucidation."

LATIF.

*Adikmet,  
Hyderabad (Dn.)*

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REPLY

*Dated 9-10-1940.*

Dr. Latif,

Adikmet, Hyderabad-Deccan.

Your telegram regret cannot agree meeting Congress Working Committee any Congress Hindu leader welcomed see me.

JINNAH.

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
10th October, 1940.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have received your telegram saying that you do not agree that I should 'meet any member of the Congress Working Committee,' and that 'any Hindu Congress leader is welcomed to see you.'

My telegram to you conveying the contents of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu's letter to which the above was your reply probably was not clear in its meaning. I enclose a full copy of her letter.



The letter makes it clear that it was in my individual capacity as Author of an 'Alternative Constitution,' and without prejudicing the official position of any party, that I was required to say whether it was possible for me to meet one or two members of the Congress Working Committee and elucidate a few points in the proposed Constitution. That being so, there is obviously no ground for me to refuse to discuss it when invited to do so, especially when the scheme claims to have been prepared for the consideration not merely of the Muslim League but of all other political parties in the land.

As you are aware, I have discussed the subject during the last one year and a half with political thinkers belonging to every camp. But neither I nor any of those with whom I have had to discuss it, have ever been in doubt about my personal role or felt that I was sponsoring the official views of the Muslim League, although everyone would see that as a Muslim my sympathies were always in favour of the Muslim League. My attitude has all along been that of a student anxious to explain a thesis to all concerned—a thesis in which I have fervently believed. In none of my writings have I ever, even unwittingly, compromised the official position of the Muslim League. In fact, I have had oft and on to attempt to bring round the leaders of the League to my way of thinking; and I cannot say to myself that my attempts have always met with full success. Even as recently as the 27th September, I had to take up so much of your time in Delhi in trying to impress upon you that your Resolution of Lahore lacked background and that its provisions, particularly the provision of mandatory safeguards for Muslim minorities, needed

to be fitted into an All-India frame-work. Such being my personal view of the League's latest official programme, I should be the last person to have compromised the official position of the League in the course of any discussion of my own scheme with anyone.

The object of my telegram to you was to find out if you, as an experienced leader enjoying my personal profound respect, would give any word of caution or advice in respect of the discussion I might have with any leading members of the Congress Working Committee. Your reply therefore is rather unexpected. You have asked me not to meet them *at all*. Of course, my meeting any one depends upon my convenience. But as Author of the Scheme, how can I refuse to discuss it when asked to do so. That would look very ridiculous and would be against the very spirit of the Scheme itself. It would have been certainly different if my scheme had been adopted by the Muslim League in its fulness, in which case I would have left its interpretation or exposition entirely to the official representatives of the League.

I pray you, therefore, to think over the matter. For the present I have given no reply to Mrs. Naidu, because it would surprise her, as it would anybody, if I should tell her that as author of an idea I could not see my way to explain it to those who seek to understand it. I shall, therefore, be happy to know that you never meant in your telegram that I should give such a reply to her.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*M. A. Jinnah, Esqr., Bar.-at-Law,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay.*

Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
Bombay,

Dated 12th October, 1940.

Dear Dr. Latif,

I have received your letter of the 10th of October 1940, with a copy of the letter addressed to you by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.

So far as I am concerned there is no misunderstanding of any kind whatsoever. It is quite clear and I am still of opinion that having regard to the position you occupy you should not wait on any member of the Congress Working Committee for the ostensible purpose suggested. If they really desire to discuss with you as the author of a scheme in your individual capacity for the purpose of elucidation, why all this fuss? They can do so by meeting you at your place, or by correspondence. But let me draw your attention to the last sentence of the first paragraph of the letter of Mrs. Naidu. It runs as follows:

It would be of course purely in your individual capacity as author of the scheme and constitution without prejudice and for the purpose of clarification of issues that might lead to an *agreed solution*.

What does this mean? Agreed solution between whom?

Besides, in my opinion, your scheme is fundamentally different from the basic principle laid down in the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, last March.

I am sorry that you do not quite appreciate the League Resolution, although I tried to explain to you in our talk on the 27th of September. You say, to

use your own words, " The object of my telegram to you was to find out if you, as an experienced leader enjoying my personal profound respect, would give any word of caution or advice in respect of the discussion I might have with any leading member of the Congress Working Committee." That is the very reason why I advised you not to be dragged into this move as you are sought to be. I still advise you to adhere to my request contained in my telegram.

We did not have sufficient time to discuss the Lahore Resolution in Delhi, as I was busy with the meeting of the Working Committee, but I shall be too glad to resume our talk in the near future.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

*Dr. S. A. Latif,  
Hyderabad.*

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
17th October, 1940.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I received your letter last evening and wired to you as under :

"I appreciate your standpoint. Will follow advice."

Mrs. Naidu has come back from Wardha and I had a talk with her to-day on the phone in connection with her letter under consideration. I told her my view, and she said that in that case, her friends on the Congress Working Committee would write to

me and seek elucidation of certain points in my constitutional scheme. Let the matter rest at that. When I actually hear from them, I shall write to you again.

As I told you in Delhi, I was practically in full agreement with the Lahore Resolution *as far as it went*. But I tried to make it clear that when you would proceed to implement it, you would have to reproduce in some form the All-India background provided in my scheme.

The Resolution provides for two compact Federated Sovereign States—one on the North-West, and the other on the North-East—even as envisaged in my alternative constitution which has been under your consideration for over a year. It too speaks of safeguards to be provided in the constitution for Muslims in areas where they are in the minority. Only my scheme details those safeguards. My contention is that the provisions of safeguards for minorities ("mandatory" as the Resolution qualifies them) will argue some reciprocal All-India arrangement such as can be effectively enforced. Indeed the Resolution states that for some time to come at least, the exercise of powers in respect of Defence, External relations, Custom, Communications, etc., will not be assumed by the States you would carve out. In other words, the Resolution anticipates a transitional All-India Constitution at least for these subjects. That is one of the reasons why I have provided a Centre—a Centre which should be agreeable to you and from where the Hindus will not be in a position to dominate the Muslims. (*Vide* the provisions in this respect under Representation on Legislature (3) and

Executive (2), pages 3 and 4 of the proposed constitution as redrafted three months ago with a view to implementing the Lahore Resolution and forwarded to Sir Abdullah Haroon for the consideration of his Constitution Committee. (Copy enclosed.)

I do not think therefore that my scheme is "fundamentally different from the basic principle laid down in the Lahore Resolution" as you say. If there is really any difference, it is in this. Mine is fully outlined; yours is only partially disclosed, though standing on all fours with it, for all intents and purposes.

But if my interpretation is not correct, and your view is that the scheme does not at all need any Centre or an all-India background to set against for implementing its provisions, and that it can stand on its own legs, then it is clear that I must endeavour to understand how all that is possible, particularly in view of the fact that I have to preside over the Ceded Districts Muslim Conference in the Presidency of Madras next month and discuss in my address the implications of the Lahore Resolution as they affect the Muslims in areas where they are in the minority—the very purpose for which the Conference has been convened. I welcome, therefore, your suggestion to resume our talk on the subject in the near future. It may be possible for me to come to Bombay in the last week of this month. Will that suit you?

With deep regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*M. A. Jinnah, Esqr.,  
Bar.-at-Law,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay.*

*Readymoney Lodge,  
Matheran,  
21st October, 1940.*

Dear Dr. Latif,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 17th of October and I shall be glad to see you in Bombay. But I shall be there only for two or three days. It will therefore be better if you come and see me at Delhi on or after the 5th of November.

As regards the other matters I do not think I need discuss them till we meet.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

*Dr. S. A. Latif.*

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
24th October, 1940.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am in receipt of your letter dated 21st October. I agree with you that it would be better if I see you at Delhi after the 5th November. I shall try to be there before the 10th.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*M. A. Jinnah, Esquire,  
Bar.-at-Law,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay.*

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## SECTION IV

*Correspondence with the late Sir Abdullah Haroon and Mr. M.A. Jinnah re. the Constitution Committee appointed by the Foreign Committee of the All-India Muslim League.*

[As Sir Abdullah Haroon states in his letter to the President of the Muslim League (page 73) a Committee composed of the authors of the various schemes submitted for the consideration of the League's Executive, was appointed under the auspices of the Foreign Committee of the League in February 1940, a few weeks before the Lahore Session, to examine jointly each such scheme and to see whether a "consolidated scheme could not be finally framed."

The author's endeavour was to see that any constitutional plan that might be recommended by this Committee should preserve the unity of India in the interests of the Muslims themselves. The spade work that was done before the Lahore Session enabled its Chairman, Sir Abdullah Haroon, to submit a memorandum to Mr. Jinnah in the light of which, according to Sir Abdullah Haroon, the Lahore Resolution was "framed by the League's Working Committee." The author was not present at the Lahore Session and was unaware of any memorandum having been submitted to Mr. Jinnah. So, when the Lahore Resolution was passed, and the author realised that it did not conform to the consensus of opinion held by the Constitution Committee, he wrote to Sir Abdullah Haroon protesting against what had been done and requesting him to convene a meeting of the Committee in order that the plan of the resolution might be set in an All-India frame-work. So, when Mr. Jinnah in the course of the correspondence given in the preceding



section suggested that the talk between them on the subject of the Lahore Resolution might be resumed, the author requested Sir Abdullah Haroon to hold a meeting of the Constitution Committee in November 1940 at Delhi, so that he could meet Mr. Jinnah there and attend the meetings of the Committee as well. This was done.

The report of the Committee ( page 73 ) is an important document and makes it clear that the Lahore Resolution necessarily calls for an All-India constitution. The author had left the demarcation of the North-West and the North-East Blocks to the other members of the Committee, but supplied the argument and data himself for the organic linkage of these blocks with the rest of India. Indeed it was arranged with the Chairman of the Committee and other members that the draft as prepared by the Secretary on the basis of the Committee's findings should be finally sent to the author in order, as Sir Abdullah Haroon's letter to him states ( page 72 ), that he might "go through it carefully and suggest all the additions, alterations and modifications which you consider necessary." The author did not add anything to it but only made a few verbal alterations here and there. The report along with the correspondence relating to it is of special value to the student of the Pakistan issue.

The preliminary note analysing the Lahore Resolution placed by the author before the Committee for its consideration is given below.]

## THE LAHORE RESOLUTION OF THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

### IMPLICATIONS

I have examined the Resolution very carefully and have come to the conclusion that it deserves earnest reconsideration. The constitutional plan

envisaged is incomplete, and needs to be set in proper perspective, if it is to be appraised at its true value by everyone concerned.

The plan indicated by the Resolution is this :

*Firstly*, British India should, by alterations in the present provincial boundaries, so resolve itself into regions or zones that two of them, one to the North-West, the other to the North-East, should secure for the Muslims a majority in population. *Secondly*, such regions should be constituted into independent states ; and the units which compose each such independent state should be "autonomous and sovereign." *Thirdly*, every such regional state "shall assume *finally*"—mark the word 'finally'—"all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary." And *lastly*, "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be provided in the constitution" for non-Muslim minorities in all Muslim regions in consultation with them, and *vice versa* for Muslim minorities in Hindu regions.

In respect of this plan there are one or two things which need to be cleared.

(1) Are the several regional states to combine for any specific purpose or purposes under a single constitution for the whole of India, or is each state to live a separate existence of its own ?

(2) The Resolution would provide "mandatory safeguards for minorities in the constitution." But

under whose mandate ? and in which constitution,— constitution of the region or of the constituent 'sovereign units' thereof, or of India as a whole ? Further, what should the safeguards be like ? At least the principles underlying them should be stated.

(3) If each state should be independent, who is to guarantee that the mandatory safeguards sought for the Muslim minorities in regional states, where Hindus predominate or for the non-Muslim minorities where the Muslims predominate, will be properly respected by the governments of the states concerned ? In other words what are the "sanctions," and who is to apply them ? Will not the Muslim minority in every Hindu regional state feel isolated, or cut off for ever from the main current of Muslim life in the North-West, and North-East, and thus create a new problem of their own in every region ? They will naturally be treated as the nationals of the state in which they live, if the states proposed are to have no constitutional connection with one another. The idea of the Muslims of India being a single nation will then have to be given up. Indeed, an All-India organization, such as the Muslim League, functioning for all the Muslims in the land, will have no meaning and cease to exist.

(4) The resolution contemplates that the proposed states would *finally* assume all powers of defence, external affairs, etc. It is problematical whether any such state will ever be financially strong enough to provide its own defence single-handed under modern conditions. Granting that it might, the Resolution

implies that at any rate for some time, the powers of defence, etc., will have to be exercised by some authority other than these states. This argues a transitional constitution for the whole of India, at least for this purpose. What is that arrangement to be like?

In view of the foregoing considerations, it seems to me that it will not be possible satisfactorily to implement the plan envisaged in the Resolution except by fitting it into an All-India constitutional plan. And what that is to be, the League should decide at the earliest moment. A tentative outline of it, as submitted by me, has been under the consideration of the Working Committee for over a year. Some of its features including the provision of regional sovereign states have, no doubt, been incorporated in the Lahore Resolution. But the background or the framework of an All-India Constitution has not been reproduced. It is only very hazily indicated where the Resolution goes on to state that the regional states will assume "all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters" not at once but "*finally*," The need for completing the picture is imperative, especially in view of the British promise to allow India attain the Status of a Dominion soon after the war, and its peoples and princes the right of framing a constitution of their own, and of settling its principles even before the war was over. Instead of waiting to see what others would suggest and then simply say 'yes' or 'no' to it, it is infinitely better to take the initiative ourselves, and leave the world in no doubt as to the

order of political life we are determined to see established in India. The outline of an All-India plan referred to above is still there before the Working Committee, and may easily form the basis on which the provisions of the Lahore Resolution may rest. If necessary, it could be modified, and even replaced by a fresh one. But the task will not brook delay. Of the questions which should engage the close attention of the Committee in this connection, that of mandatory safeguards is of supreme importance to the Muslims of all those provinces where they are in the minority. They are alarmed at the plan envisaged in the Resolution, and are therefore to be assured that their position is safe under it, and also shown how it is so.

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FOREIGN OFFICE

ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

*786, Napier Road,  
Karachi, India,  
11th February, 1941.*

Dear Sir,

I enclose herewith draft Report of the Constitution Sub-Committee drawn up in the light of the conclusions arrived at in the successive meetings held at Delhi. You are now requested to kindly go through it carefully and suggest all the additions,

alterations and modifications which you may consider necessary.

Kindly return the corrected draft within a week's time.

With best wishes,

Yours faithfully,  
(Sd.) H. ABDULLAH HAROON,  
Chairman,

Foreign Sub-Committee, All-India  
Muslim League, Napier Road, Karachi.

*Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, Ph.D.,  
Adikmet, Hyderabad-Deccan.*

---

(True Copy)

*Napier Road, Karachi,  
23rd December, 1940.*

From

HAJI SIR ABDULLAH HAROON, KT., M.L.A.,  
Chairman, Foreign Sub-Committee, All-India  
Muslim League, Napier Road, Karachi.

To

*The President,  
All-India Muslim League.*

Sir,

I have the honour to state as follows :

1. That in February this year the Foreign Committee had issued an invitation to the authors of the various schemes of constitutional Reform for India, to meet together under the auspices of the said

Committee in order to examine jointly each such scheme and see whether a consolidated scheme cannot be finally framed. That invitation was promptly accepted by all the authors, who formed themselves into a Committee and assembled at Delhi, first, in February last, then again in November last. In the first sitting only figure work was done and in the second meeting the main principles were laid down. In the following pages are given the findings of and result of the investigations conducted by the said Committee of authors.

2. That the following gentlemen constituted the Committee alluded to in the preceding para :

- (i) Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon, Kt., M. L. A. (Central),
- (ii) Maulana Ghulam Rasool Mehr, Editor "Inqilab", Lahore,
- (iii) Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot,
- (iv) Mr. Rizwanullah, M.L.A., Secretary Provincial Muslim League, Lucknow,
- (v) Dr. Afzal Hussain Qadri, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Muslim University Aligarh,
- (vi) Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, Ph.D., Hyderabad-Deccan,
- (vii) Chaudhry Akhtar Hussain, M.L.C., Lucknow,
- (viii) Mr. A. Punjabi, Lahore, and
- (ix) Syed Ali Muhammad H. Rashidi, Secretary, Sind Provincial Muslim League.

3. The arguments in support of the plan embodied in the following pages, have not been touched here for the present. That part of the work has been assigned to Maulana Ghulam Rasool Mehr and

Mr. Rashidi who are expected to produce a booklet on the subject for general public consumption. In this report only that material has been given which pertains to the scheme as such. If the All-India Muslim League accepts the findings, then the arguments will be produced and published.

## I

4. The Committee formed as the basis of its consideration the Resolution adopted by the All-India Muslim League at its last Lahore Session. Obviously this Resolution had been framed by the Working Committee in the light of the outline placed in your hands by me in the shape of a small Memorandum in February last. The Resolution as it finally emerged out of the Session enunciated a few basic principles which had to underlie every constitutional plan which might be devised for British India. The task before the Committee was not merely to suggest a method whereby the principles so laid down by the Resolution might be implemented, but to see in what manner the League plan could cover the future of Muslims in non-British India as well; for the Committee felt that no constitutional plan for the nine crore Musalmans of India would be complete without bringing the question of the Muslims in the Indian States within its purview. The plan suggested below is thus fuller than the one revealed in the said Resolution. The Committee hopes that it will be borne in mind that the recommendations made to the extent set forth hereunder all fall within the



four corners of the Lahore Resolution and are intended just to give a shape to the provision only broadly indicated therein.

5. The Lahore Resolution laid down three principles :

- (a) That the British India should resolve itself into regions formed of contiguous parts through such territorial readjustments as may be necessary in order that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India might be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
- (b) That these regional states shall *assume finally* "all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."
- (c) That "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities."

6. The Committee has very carefully examined the distribution of population in India and found that although the Muslims were haphazardly dispersed all over the land ; yet there existed areas where Muslim States could conveniently be established by virtue of forming the majority of the population therein. The Committee has examined the position of such areas and recommended that one Muslim State can be formed in the North-West and another in the North-

East. It might be stated that the Muslim percentages that can be secured under this arrangement would be in the vicinity of 63% in the North-West and 54% in the North-East.

7. With regard to the Muslim State in the North-West, I am to state that the Committee has made the following observations :

### NORTH-WEST STATE

“ Having regard to the principle involved that the state to be formed should be composed of territories contiguous to each other, and at the same time to the sad fact that even in this area the Muslims are not evenly distributed and that it is intersected by small native states which cannot be absorbed except on a federal basis, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the present provinces of Sind, British Baluchistan, N.-W.F.P., and the Punjab should be grouped together to constitute a federal sovereign state with the Delhi Province amalgamated with the Punjab, in view not merely of its racial and cultural affinity but because of its long historic connections with Muslim life. The idea has been suggested to extend the Eastern boundary of the Punjab to cover a small area of U. P., so as to let the great centre of Muslim culture namely Aligarh form part of this main Muslim zone. But how the percentage of Muslims in the Punjab will be affected by the inclusion of this small strip from U. P. has not been worked out. A note about it will follow at an early date. . . .

The figures will work out as follows :

NORTHERN MUSLIM ZONE  
*Population Figures (1931)*  
MUSLIM POSITION

Province	Total population	Muslim population
Punjab ...	23,580,852	13,332,460
Sind ...	3,887,070	2,830,800
N.-W. F. P. (Settled) ...	2,425,076	2,227,303
N.-W. F. P. (Tribal Area administered by the British) ...	1,367,231	1,317,231
British Baluchistan ...	463,508	405,309
Delhi Province ...	636,246	206,960
Total ...	32,360,063	20,320,063

*Explanation.*—These figures indicate the position of Muslims within the British territory in the Northern zone including Delhi. The Muslim percentage of population within this zone works out at 62·79.

8. With regard to the other states in the North-East, the Committee are of the view that it should include the present provinces of Assam and Bengal (excluding Bankura and Midnapur districts) and the district of Purnea from Behar whose population is racially and culturally akin to that of Bengal.

The figures of this area are as follows :

Total population	57,010,946	
Muslims	30,876,421	percentage 54
Non-Muslims	26,134,525	do. 46

Among the non-Muslims, roughly about 8,500,000 *i.e.*, 32% are members of the scheduled classes, about 1,500,000, *i.e.*, 6% are Tribals and about 4 lakhs are Christians, and the rest are Caste Hindus.

### THIRD ZONE OF MUSLIM INFLUENCE AND POWER

#### NIZAM'S DOMINIONS

9. It has been suggested above that although the Lahore Resolution is primarily influenced in its plan by the needs of Muslims in British India, the Committee deems it a duty to point out that even in their own interests as of the rest of the Muslims, it would be desirable to conserve and perpetuate the Muslim influence wherever it predominates in any form in non-British India. Hence it is that all the native states, large or small, ruled by Muslim Princes, should be regarded for purposes of the Muslim constitutional plan as *sovereign Muslim States*. This must be made a basic demand. Of such Muslim States, Hyderabad with its vast territory is not a feudatory or creation of the British Government in the sense every other native state whether Muslim or Hindu is. Besides being the principal seat of the culture of Muslim India it is an independent state in its own inherent and historic rights, with whom the British Government have entered into treaties for *mutual benefit as allies*, and is indeed the sovereign of various territories held by

the British as Inam Jagirs, etc. with obligations to discharge certain military duties for the Nizam. When British India is to attain dominion status sooner or later under which the British Government will transfer its power to an Indian Government, the treaties entered into between the Nizam and the British Government will cease to operate; the Nizam will return to the *status quo* with all his *Mufawiza* lands wrongly styled 'ceded territories' returned to him with perfect freedom to contract any treaties he may like with the Governments of adjoining States. Indeed a demand to this effect has already been made by the Muslims of the Dominions of Hyderabad. It would be appropriate that the League should concentrate its aim on the independence and integrity of an expanded dominion of the Nizam with an opening to the sea, as it will be a source of infinite strength to the Muslims in India outside of the Dominions. Who knows that in the fullness of time the Muslims of India might find it to their advantage to make Hyderabad their rallying point and the centre of their growing strength.

This will thus be the third wide sphere of Muslim influence, the other two being those in the N.-W. and the North-East—the three forming a triangular stronghold of the Muslims of India.

## II

10. The Committee has also examined the possibilities of the Native States adjacent to the Muslim States federating with the latter for some common purposes. Should any such arrangement be ever

made the position would be as follows :

NORTHERN MUSLIM ZONE

States which may federate	Total population	Muslim population
<i>Frontier States</i>		
Dir, Swat and Chitral ...	902,075	852,000
<i>Baluchistan States</i>		
Kalat ...	342,101	331,234
Las Bela ...	63,008	61,550
<i>Sind States</i>		
Khairpur Mirs ...	227,183	186,577
<i>Punjab States</i>		
Bahawalpur ...	984,612	799,176
Kapurthala ...	316,757	179,251
Patiala ...	1,625,520	363,920
Nabha ...	287,574	57,393
Faridkot ...	164,364	49,912
Jind ...	324,676	46,002
Malerkotla ...	83,072	31,417
Loharu ...	23,338	3,119
Pataudi ...	18,873	3,168
Dujana ...	28,216	5,863
Chamba ...	146,870	10,839
Mandi ...	270,465	6,351
Suket ...	58,408	733
Kalsia ...	59,848	21,797
Simla Hill States ...	330,850	10,017
Sirmur ...	148,568	7,020
Bilaspur ...	100,994	1,458
Kashmir ...	3,646,243	2,817,636
Total ...	10,153,615	5,846,433

If these States federate or confederate with the Northern Muslim zone the percentage of Muslims within that entire zonal arrangement would be 61·54.

If, for certain considerations, the Rajputana States of Bikaner and Jaisalmer are also included in this arrangement the figures would be as follows :

States	Total population	Muslim population
Bikaner ...	936,218	141,578
Jaisalmer ...	76,255	22,116
TOTAL ( figures given in the table on page 81 are included) ...	10,166,088	6,010,127

The following is the grand total of the whole population within the entire Northern Zone comprising the British Provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab, N.-W.F.P., Delhi and the Native States mentioned above, Bikaner and Jaisalmer included :

Total population	....	43,526,151
Muslim population	....	26,330,190
Muslim percentage	....	60·49

If Bikaner and Jaisalmer are excluded the position will stand as follows :—

Total population	....	42,513,678
Muslim population	....	26,166,526
Muslim percentage	....	61·54

11. In case of the Eastern Muslim State the following adjoining States can be persuaded to federate :

## BENGAL STATES

Name of State	Total population	Muslim population
Cooch Behar and Tripura States	973,316	312,476

## ASSAM STATES

Name of State	Total population	Muslim population
Manipur & Khasi Hill States	625,606	24,600

The position of the Eastern Muslim State would be as follows :

Total population	....	58,609,868
Muslims	....	31,213,497
Non-Muslims	....	27,396,371

The percentage of the Muslims would stand at 53.15 and of the non-Muslims at 46.85

## III

12. In order to ascertain the position of *Caste Hindus* within this arrangement the Committee have prepared the table given on the next page which indicates the position of the minorities in the Northern Muslim State.



## (1) BRITISH TERRITORIES

Province	Total Non-Muslim Population	Scheduled Castes	Sikhs	Christians	CASTE HINDUS	
					Population	Percentage
Punjab ...	10,248,392	1,279,459	3,064,144	414,788	5,490,031	23.2
Sind ...	1,056,270	40,000	18,505	15,133	982,623	25.2
N.-W. F. P. ...	197,773	5,468	42,510	12,213	137,582	8.1
Do. tribal area administered by Britain ..	Exact figures not available					
Baluchistan ...	50,000	10,000	...	...	40,000	2.9
Delhi Province ...	58,199	5,722	8,368	8,044	36,065	7.77
	429,236	72,883	6,437	16,989	332,977	52.02
Total ...	12,039,920	1,413,532	3,139,964	467,167	7,019,278	21.69

(These figures include the population of smaller minorities such as Buddhists, and Jains.)

## (2) NATIVE STATES

State	Total Non-Muslim Population	Scheduled Castes	Sikhs	Christians	CASTE HINDUS (These figures include small minorities also)	
					Population	Percentage
Dir, Swat and Chitral ...	50,075	No figures available		...	50,075	5.54
Kalat ...	10,867	do.		...	10,867	2.50
Las Bela ...	1,458	do.		...	1,458	2.02
Khairpur ...	40,651	do.		...	40,651	17.06
Kashmir ...	828,607	170,928	50,662	2,263	604,756	16.56
Punjab States, Pataudi, Dujana ...						
Kalsia, Simla States ...	396,942	94,347	10,854	206	291,541	66.59
Punjab States Agency ...	2,915,627	329,999	199,626	4,359	1,494,745	33.60
Total ...	4,244,227	595,274	1,058,142	6,828	2,494,093	22.33

*Note.*—According to the figures given in the preceding two tables the total strength of the caste Hindus in the British territories in the Northern zone, is 21·69 only and within the aforesaid States their percentage is 22·33 only.

13. The position of the minorities within the Eastern Muslim State is indicated by the following tables :

(a) POSITION OF THE NON-MUSLIM POPULATION  
IN BRITISH BENGAL

		Percentage
Caste Hindus	... 14,999,056	29·9
Scheduled classes	... 6,899,809	13·7
Tribal population	... 528,037	1·5
Christians	... 180,299	...
Sikhs	... 7,320	...

(b) IN BENGAL STATES

Caste Hindus	... 630,038	64·9
Scheduled classes	... 30,822	3·0

(c) IN BRITISH ASSAM

Caste Hindus	... 3,123,274	36·6
Scheduled classes	... 1,829,009	21·0
Tribals	... 711,432	8·2
Christians	... 202,586	2·5

(d) IN ASSAM STATES

Tribals	... 280,958
Caste Hindus	... 273,288
Christians	... 46,660

These figures indicate the numerical strength of various minority communities within the various units in the two Muslim States.

## IV

14. The Committee worked out the figures of the area in respect of Northern and Eastern zones covered by their proposals. The results were as follows :

## EASTERN ZONE

British Bengal excluding Bankura and Midnapur Districts	...	69,651	sq. miles
Assam (British)	...	55,014	do.
Purnea District of Bihar	...	4,972	do.
		<hr/>	
Bengal and Assam States	...	129,637	do.
		17,754	do.
		<hr/>	
Grand Total	...	147,391	do.

## NORTHERN ZONE

*British Territory*

Sind	...	46,378	sq. miles
Baluchistan	...	54,228	do.
Frontier Province	...	13,518	do.
Tribal Area (Administered by the British)	...	11,455	do.
Punjab	...	99,200	do.
Delhi	...	573	do.
		<hr/>	
Total	...	225,352	do.

*States*

Baluchistan States	...	80,410	sq. miles
Frontier States	...	11,383	do.
Punjab States	...	5,820	do.
Punjab States Agency	...	31,241	do.
Kashmir	...	84,516	do.
		<hr/>	
Total	...	213,370	do.

Grand total of Northern Zone States and British Territory combined	...	438,722	sq. miles
		<hr/>	
Total area of both the zones	...	586,113	do.

15. The Committee has prepared an abstract of the population figures covered by their plan which is as follows according to the census of 1931, under Religion :

Total population of whole India	...	350,529,557
Muslim population	...	77,678,245
Muslim population within the Western and Eastern Muslim Zones, States in- cluded	...	57,542,787

The percentage of the Muslim population to which the Committee has been able to give protection under the scheme of constituting these two Muslim zones is 74·07. In other words, out of the total Muslim population in India the Committee has protected about 74·07 per cent. of them by these proposals.

## V

16. The Lahore Resolution of the League does not look forward to the proposed regional states assuming immediately as they are formed powers of defence, external affairs, custom, etc. This argues that there should be a transitional stage during which these powers would be exercised by some agency common to them all. Such a common co-ordinating agency would be necessary even independent of the above consideration; for, under the third principle of the Resolution, it will be impossible to implement effectively the provision of safeguards for minorities without some organic relationship subsisting between the States under Muslim influence and the States

under the Hindu influence. A federation is not to the taste of the Muslims, because they fear that the Hindus will, on the strength of their majority, dominate the Muslims. But since some common arrangement is essential to the fulfilment of the provisions of the resolution, an agreed formula has to be devised whereby the Muslims shall share the control at the Centre on terms of perfect equality with the non-Muslims.

## INTER-RELATION BETWEEN STATES

17. All the proposed states designated "Sovereign" and all the States under the Princes being restored to their full sovereignty should, in free agreement, enter into a joint pact to have a common agency to look after in the name of all the component States, certain specified subjects delegated to it, it being specifically stipulated :

- (a) That all the residuary powers shall vest in the individual States.
- (b) That the delegated subjects except in cases otherwise provided for shall be administered by the Government of the individual States in so far as they pertain to their State areas.
- (c) And that both on its Executive and other Bodies, the Muslims shall have half the seats.

The subjects to be assigned to this Central machinery shall be (a) External relations, (b) Defence (c) Communications, (d) Customs, (e) Safeguards for minorities and voluntary intermigration, etc., subject to the following provisos in respect of defence and intermigration :

#### DEFENCE

(a) Each component State shall maintain an Army at its own expense, the strength of which will be dependent on the importance of its strategic position and specified in the compact. The Centre will share the military expenditure of each State according to the strength of the Army maintained. In normal times the military force in each State will be controlled by its own Military Department and supervised by the Centre. But in times of war, full control will be assumed by the Central Agency.

(b) The Navy will be entirely under the control of the Centre subject to such concessions as the Coastal States might need.

18. One of the functions of the Central machinery shall be to facilitate intermigration of Muslims and Hindus wherever sought and wherever necessary, between States or between parts of the same State so as to promote a sense of security among them. For this, the necessary Legislation shall be passed for each State, and a machinery will be set up to organize and regulate such migration and assign compensation for property in all forms left behind by migrants.

## VI

## SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES

19. In respect of the question of safeguards for minorities which was the last item under consideration, the Committee thought that this item might be profitably considered only when the principles indicated above in respect of the formation of the proposed States and their inter-relation is considered by the Working Committee of the Muslim League.

20. The Committee tried to find out if it was possible to make some arrangement for the Muslims scattered in the minority Provinces, whether by providing them with autonomous cantons of their own in the Hindu States where the Muslims might gradually concentrate by migration. A proposal was put forth before the Committee that the U. P. Musalmans be provided with a small autonomous state composed of the five districts of Rohilkhand division namely Bareilly, Bijnor, Budaun, Moradabad and Shahjehanpur, as well as Muzaffarpur, Meerut and Bulandshahr, and Aligarh. The Committee examined the position and found that the figure of total population within this combination stood at 10,955,397 as against the Muslim population of 2,764,258 which meant that for the sake of 25% Muslims we would be creating complications for 75% population. This plan for practical reasons was considered hopeless.

Then, along the same lines, the Committee went into the question of having an autonomous Muslim zone somewhere in Behar. The Committee examined the

proposal of converting the Behar Districts of Bhagalpur, Darbhanga, Santal Pargana, Mirzapur Champaran, Saran and Patna as well as the adjoining districts of Gorakhpur and Basti in U. P. into a Muslim zone for purposes of migration in the future. But that proposal also was found unworkable in so far as the figure of total population within the zone stood at 22,566,941 whereas the Muslim population was only 2,904,540. The Muslim percentage was as low as 13%.

Lastly the Committee analysed the third proposal of a similar nature in respect of the conversion into a Muslim zone of the Districts of South Kanara and Malabar in the Madras Presidency, but that also did not entail any hopeful results. The difference between the Muslim and non-Muslim population in those Districts would be reflected by the following figures :

Muslim population	1,343,663
Total population	4,906,185
The Muslim percentage being 27·38	

The Committee consulted Haji Abdul Sattar Ishak Sait, M.L.A. (Central), as a representative of the Madras Muslims and Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan, M.L.A. (Central) as representing the view-point of the C.P. Muslims. Protracted discussion with those gentlemen did not, however, alter the position in any way, nor could they offer any suggestion for getting over this difficulty.

21. I do not claim that this report presents a complete picture of the whole thing. The outline needs much amplification but the Committee can



conveniently do this, should its conclusions as given in this report find favour with the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient servant,  
(Sd.) H. A. HAROON  
CHAIRMAN,  
*Foreign Sub-Committee,  
All-India Muslim League.*

---

*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
20th February, 1941.*

Dear Sir Abdullah Haroon,

Thanks for your letter dated 11th February 1941, received day before yesterday. I have looked into the Draft. It is in order. I have made only certain verbal alterations here and there, as you will find from your original which is returned herewith. Along with it I am sending you a fair typed copy of it for the sake of clearness.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, Kt., M.L.A.,  
Legislative Assembly, New Delhi.*

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## FOREIGN OFFICE

## ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

786, *Napier Road,*  
*Karachi,*  
26th February, 1941.

Dear Dr. Sayed Abdul Latif,

You remember on 11th February 1941, I had sent you a copy of the draft report of Constitution Sub-Committee to which Mr. Mohammad Afzal Hussain Qadri, has made a reply, copy enclosed. I now await your reply so as to dispose of the work as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Yours faithfully,

(Sd.) H. A. HAROON,  
Chairman,

*Foreign Sub-Committee,*  
*All-India Muslim League,*  
*Napier Road, Karachi.*

[P.S.—I am to say with regret that the contents of previous draft report sent by me to members appear to have been released to press which should not be repeated and therefore this communication may be treated as confidential.]

MOHAMMED AFZAL HUSAIN QADRI,  
M.Sc., Ph.D. (Alig.), Ph.D. (Cantab).

*Department of Zoology,  
Muslim University, Aligarh,  
23rd February, 1941.*

My dear Sir Haroon,

I am in receipt of your letter dated 11th Feb. 1941, along with the report of the committee working in connection with the Lahore Resolution. I was surprised to find it released for publication before it has been actually completed. It is only a first draft of our discussions. Much of it needs correction and rewriting. There are a number of its conclusions which should be materially altered. Its release to the press in a premature state is unfortunate and has done more harm than good to the cause we are striving for.

Regarding the report I think that the terms of our Committee do not extend beyond the Lahore Resolution and all we have to do is to substantiate the ground for our claim of two sovereign Muslim States within British India. I therefore see no need for the inclusion of Hyderabad and other States in the main body of our report nor is there any ground for our suggesting the constitution of inter-relation between Muslim States and the rest of India. The above suggestions should have been given separately of the report.

Regarding the above two matters *viz.*, native states including Hyderabad and the inter-relation I personally feel that the Muslim League should confine itself only to British India and should demand only two separate sovereign states.

Regarding the interrelation I strongly feel that nothing like "central machinery" or "centre" should creep into our demands either in *letter* or *spirit*. It savours of All-India Federation or Hindu Raj. It should be meant as well as named as a *pact* of sovereign Muslim states with the rest of India.

I send you other suggestions regarding the report attached herewith.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) AFZAL HUSAIN QADRI.

*Page 4.*—Small area of U. P., so as to let the great centre of Muslim Culture namely a portion of Aligarh district adjoining the Gurgaon district of the Punjab from part of this main zone.

*Page 5.*—No exclusion of Midnapur and Bankura should be sought as it will raise the question of readjustment of Provinces with the result that at least six districts of Western Bengal will ask for their exclusion from the Muslim zone of North-Eastern India.

*Page 5.*—The demand of sovereign rights for small and large Muslim (hence also Hindu) states, must not be made. The claim, if made at all, may be restricted to *Hyderabad* on the analogy of Nepal.

*Page 12.*—The transitional stage implicit in the Lahore Resolution does not in the least mean any Muslim status short of complete independence and full sovereignty at any stage either transitional, *vis a vis* the British Government or the Hindu India.

*Pages 12, 13.*—The portion of the report 'Inter relation between States' needs to be essentially

modified and the following alteration made in it :

- (i) The Inter-relationship must be an *international alliance* based on equality and reciprocity.
- (ii) The ' Central Machinery ' should not be an executive but only an *advisory body*.
- (iii) All the various apparatus of defence, army, air-force and navy must wholly belong to the sovereign states and not to the central advisory body. The latter should have no direct control over them, but only the right of co-ordinating them through the various sovereign states.
- (iv) The sovereign Muslim States should not be required to delegate all powers concerning External Relations and defence to the central advisory body. Only parts of these as absolutely essential for mutual relationship on equal terms may fall within the purview of that body. For foreign relations they must have their separate representatives and treaties with the British Government and with any other state they like.

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Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
8th March, 1941.

Dear Sir Abdullah Haroon,

Yours of the 26th February reached me here on the 5th instant.

The Draft Report of the Constitution Sub-Committee, as touched up by me, was despatched from

here to the address of the Legislative Assembly, New Delhi, on the 20th February. I have been under the impression that it was delivered to you while you were at Delhi. You may write for it to the Legislative Secretary. I did not alter anything materially therein. Only here and there verbal alterations were made, and the English corrected as required by you.

*The Statesman* of Delhi gave out your Draft Report on the 18th February, and the Delhi Correspondents of Provincial papers forthwith telegraphed a summary of it to their respective centres saying that the Foreign Committee of the League had published the Report on the 17th. You say that the publication was not authentic. Whatever that be, since the *Delhi Statesman* had in some manner access to it at Delhi when you were all there, there is now no use in calling upon the members of your Committee to treat it as confidential. In respect of any further development of the subject, however, your instructions should certainly be borne in mind.

I have read Mr. Afzal Husain Qadri's letter, a copy of which you have been good enough to send me. He has gone back on what he had agreed to in the Committee meetings last February, and has come out with new suggestions. I do not think that this is a good procedure. If we are to entertain additions and subtractions at this rate, you will move in a vicious circle. After all, it is the Working Committee of the League which has to take decisions.

So far, I have willingly given you my time as a member of your Committee but feel reluctant to attend any further meetings of it, as it has no *locus*

*standi*, and its findings have no official value with the Executive of the League, and I have really no time for merely academic discussions. Unhappily for me, I have begun to feel of late that the cry for Pakistan, as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution, has no clearness of plan or programme or fullness of design behind it such as might touch satisfactorily the nine crores of Muslims in whose name and on whose behalf the cry is going out from our circles and platforms. I may, should I feel like it, address a note on the subject to Mr. Jinnah before the meeting of the Madras Session and furnish copies of it to the members of the League's Working Committee and some of the more prominent members of the League's Council for their kind consideration, and feel that I have done my duty by the League.

I am not satisfied with the demarcation of the North-West and North-East blocks as suggested in the Committee's Report. The Lahore Resolution aims at homogeneous and compact blocks or states with an overwhelming Muslim majority. But the Punjab and Aligarh members of your Committee through their imperialistic designs over essentially non-Muslim areas would like to have a larger Punjab extending even to Aligarh covering all the non-Muslim states from Kashmir to Jaisalmer which reduces the Muslim percentage to 55. In like manner they would include in the North-East block, the whole of Bengal, Assam and a district from Behar which brings the percentage of Musalmans down to 54. In my humble opinion this kind of demarcation is against the spirit and aim of the Lahore Resolution; because with 46 per cent.

non-Muslims in the North-East block, and 42 per cent. in the North-West block, you cannot call your states as Muslim States in any sense of the term, nor style them as Muslim zones. I am not responsible for this demarcation, for it was left entirely to the Punjab, Sind and U. P. members. I would rather be content with smaller states where I can command at least an 80 per cent. majority of Muslims and call those states my own. I am, however, glad of one thing, that your Committee's Report has taken into consideration the need for including Hyderabad within its constitutional plan as designed by me.

As for the rest I do not think that I should worry you at this stage. I hope and trust that the League Executive would concentrate its attention on the needs of the Muslim minorities outside of the proposed two Muslim blocks with as much zest as it is doing in their case and that this would be reflected in the decisions to be taken at Madras.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, Kt.,  
Napier Road, Karachi.*

Copy to M. A. Jinnah, Esquire.

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*Yusuf Manzil, Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan.  
8th March, 1941.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I beg to enclose herewith a copy of the letter which I have addressed to Sir Abdullah Haroon in respect



of the Report of the Constitution Sub-Committee of which he was the Chairman. You may give it a kind consideration.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*M. A. Jinnah, Esquire,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay.*

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*10, Aurangzeb Road,  
New Delhi,  
15th March, 1941.*

Dear Dr. Latif,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, and I have repeatedly made it clear to you and publicly that the Muslim League has appointed no such committee as you keep harping upon ; and neither the Muslim League nor I can recognise any of these suggestions or proposals of these so-called schemes, except as I have said any suggestion from individuals or groups will receive due consideration.

Please therefore let me make it clear once for all that neither Sir Abdullah Haroon nor you should go on talking of this committee or that committee and involving the Muslim League or its authority behind the proposals that may be formulated by individuals or groups.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

*Dr. S. A. Latif.*

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## SECTION V

### *The substance of Pakistan Proposal*

[The Pakistan Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League had widened the gulf between the Congress and the League. But when that Resolution was incorporated at the League's session at Madras into the very text of its creed, the estrangement between them grew acute. The deadlock seemed so unresolvable that it seemed to the author imperative that some *modus operandi* should be devised on the basis of each conceding to the other the substance of their respective demands, *viz.*, sense of security and sovereign status to Pakistan areas on the one hand and of political unity to the whole of India on the other. The idea is set forth in a circular addressed to select leaders in every camp. The replies received will if reproduced swell the volume. Besides those from the League leaders were not intended for publication but just to offer their moral support to the proposal. Only the correspondence with Dr. Rajendra Prasad has been singled out from amongst the replies from Congress leaders as it covered fuller ground than the rest, and represented the general attitude of the Congress at the time.

It may be noticed that the author suggests :—

(1) Sovereign status and largest measure of autonomy to units, residuary powers vesting in them.

(2) A composite centre looking after a minimum of common subjects mutually delegated to it by units and constituted in a manner such as shall not allow any community or combination of units to gain an upper hand over other communities or units.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad agrees to :

- (1) the largest measure of autonomy, and
- (2) suggests that the residuary powers should be reduced to a minimum without vesting them in the units, but evades other issues. That was the extent to which the Congress mind could go at this stage.

Mr. Jinnah remains silent.]

*Adikmet,  
Hyderabad Deccan,  
16th May, 1941.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I pray you to give an earnest thought to the enclosed. As you know, I have, during the last few years, in my own humble way, tried to support the cause of the League, and so I hope you will not misunderstand me when I have ventured to suggest a compromise at this stage with the other parties on the basis of conceding to the Muslims the *substance* of your demand.

I am not in the habit of raising an alarm ; but allow me to say that your Madras Resolution has saddened some of your best friends, including me. The Pakistan idea has served its purpose ; it has roused the necessary political consciousness among the Muslims. But that consciousness now needs to run into practical channels. And I suggest to you that if you should find that the Congress, in particular, is willing to consider in consultation with you the formula advanced in the circular, you will do well to welcome such a move.

I have too great a regard for you to see you handled roughly by your critics, and I am afraid that that will

be your experience if the League is allowed to persist in an overstatement of its case any longer. As I have made no secret of my views to you, I may repeat that the Pakistan scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim States properly so-called ; nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem ; nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India, unless a wholesale exchange of population is effected, which no one favours. I am not the only person to hold this view. A compromise on the *basis of complete separation* is unthinkable, and I, therefore, entreat you to give your best thought to the proposal. It will save faces on either side. The proposal is a compromise between two extreme views, and should be worthy of your kindest consideration.

Should replies favourable to the formula be received by me from leaders of the other parties, I shall, without waiting for their publication in the Journal, at once communicate them to you for your consideration, if you so desire.

I hope you have improved in your health.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

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*Hyderabad-Deccan,  
15th May, 1941.*

## CONSTITUTIONAL PLAN FOR INDIA

DR. SYED ABDUL LATIF'S CIRCULAR ADDRESSED  
TO SELECT LEADERS OF THE CONGRESS AND  
THE LEAGUE.

The unfortunate and growing cleavage between the Muslim League and the Congress is causing immeasurable damage to the progress of India; and I think it is high time that earnest minds in the land strive and co-operate in finding a solution—not a patch-work compromise, but an agreeable and permanent solution—by bringing about some sort of harmony between their respective ideologies and programmes.

Obstacles in the way of a rapprochement are of diverse character, and one in your position could not be unaware of them. But there are two obstacles which we shall have to get over at all costs. One is the ideology which the Muslim League has developed aiming at the partition of the country; the other is the opposition to that ideology. It will serve no useful purpose to bring to mind the conditions under which the League ideology took its birth and thrived. The fact stands that it is now a force to reckon with. There was a time when it could have easily taken a different shape; but opportunities were missed allowing it to grow more and more rigid in its form. I, who knew its trend from the beginning, while

supporting the cause of Muslim solidarity through my publications—*The Cultural Future of India* (1938) and *The Muslim Problem in India* (1939) was particularly anxious to see that this newly growing Muslim outlook was set against an All-India background, by dwelling on the need for an alternative constitution such as would "allow none to gain an upper hand over the other, and yet afford them all every moral urge to care for each other, and work together for the lasting good of their common motherland", and thereby make each party a trustee for every other party. But the atmosphere was not helpful.

The 'Pakistan' idea of the Muslim League has its strong, as well as, its weak points; and no one, I fancy, has drawn the attention of Mr. Jinnah to its weaknesses with greater earnestness than I have in the course of personal discussion and correspondence. That idea now is part of the League's creed—a logical end as it might seem, in the absence of any direct attempt at compromise. But I have not lost hope of readjustment; and in this I seek your co-operation.

The primary impulse, as you may be knowing, which ranged the Muslim League sternly against the federal part in particular of the Government of India Act of 1935, and engendered in its mind the idea of partition was the fear of a strong Centre where Muslims would be submerged by non-Muslims. That fear must be removed if a lasting settlement is to be reached. But it is for the majority party to show how this could be done. For aught I know, it seems to me that a solution is possible, if at least the substance of the Muslim League demand is conceded.

Shorn of its separatist touch or character, that demand amounts to no more than a strong desire for the utmost freedom from an external Centre in the internal administration of the provinces in the North-West and the North-East of India where the Muslims are in the majority. If that is the actual objective, it should not be difficult for the League to favour an arrangement under which those provinces, as constituent Units in a new constitution, are assured, equally with other Units, the maximum or the utmost possible autonomy consistent with the safety of India as a whole. This will argue that the residuary powers shall vest in the Units and that the Centre should be such as not to allow any particular party to dominate other parties. Such a plan will afford to the contending parties the *substance* of their respective demands—sense of security and sovereign status to each unit on the one hand, and political unity for the whole of India on the other. If this were possible, and I see no reason why it should not be, then the question of effective and adequate constitutional safeguards for minorities in constituent Units—the only other basic demand of the League—will not present any serious difficulty. Details, of course, will take time to settle. But if the leading parties in the land agree on some such principles of settlement as indicated above, the present deadlock might easily be resolved by setting up an interim composite government at the Centre and like composite governments in all provinces for the duration of the war. The Indian Princes may be invited to enter into the picture on agreed terms at the time of framing a new constitution.

Such is in broad outline my view of a possible settlement. Other views may as well be advanced with equal conviction; but I feel certain that no agreement is likely to be lasting unless it is conceived on an All-India basis. Ideas may differ on what maximum autonomy for a Unit should mean, and what a Centre should be like where the Muslims could feel absolutely safe. But the two ideas must go together and blend in a manner agreeable to all the parties concerned.

(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

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*Dr. Rajendra Prasad's reply to Dr. S. A. Latif.*

*Sadaquat Ashram,  
Patna,  
22nd May, 1941.*

My dear Dr. Latif,

I have received your circular letter dated the 15th May, 1941. It is somewhat difficult for me to deal with the questions raised in your letter because I do not possess any status to speak on behalf of any group or party or community and also because I do not know if the discussion which you are initiating will lead to any result. The Congress has never refused to discuss any scheme and any proposal for bringing about a settlement of the Communal Problem. Our trouble has been that we have never been allowed to get to the stage where concrete suggestions could be put forward or considered. But it is no use raking up old controversy.



The question of vesting residuary powers in the Units of the Federation and not in the Centre has been discussed in the past, may be discussed again, but I have always felt that it is a question whose dimensions and extent can be reduced to a minimum by defining subjects falling within the sphere of the Centre and the Units as minutely and exhaustively as possible. It cannot be denied that there are certain matters, as for example, Defence and Foreign Relations, which cannot and ought not to be in the charge of Units. For one thing the Units will not have the resources to deal with them adequately. It would also duplicate expenses and machinery if each Unit of the Federation has its own defence arrangements and foreign policy. So far as internal administration is concerned, fairly wide powers are enjoyed by Provincial Governments even under the Act of 1935, and they may certainly be extended if on an examination it is found that there are any matters which are left out but which should come under the jurisdiction of the Units. The fundamental thing which cannot be conceded by any one who does not approve of Partition of India is that these Units shall not have sovereign power which will militate against the sovereignty of India as a whole and thus expose the country to conflicting policies dictated by the Centre and the Units. Instead of insisting upon theoretically complete sovereignty for the Units, would it not be better to consider the whole question in detail and visualise and define in what respects interference in the internal administration of a Unit can be apprehended and in what way that can be constitu-

tionally prevented? I do not apprehend that as long as unity and safety of India as a whole are guaranteed, questions relating to the distribution of power between the Centre and the Units would present insurmountable difficulties. But any device which in any way jeopardises the unity and safety of India as a whole is not likely to be accepted by the vast majority of Indians.

There is another aspect of the problem which has to be considered. It is well known that all the different Units which will constitute the Federation are not equally well-placed in the matter of natural resources. India taken as a whole has got almost all the resources which a modern country needs for its development. But that cannot be said of each Unit singly. Is it suggested that each Unit will be free to exploit its own natural resources even to the detriment of all other Units and the country as a whole? Independent sovereign status for each Unit would imply that. If any zone becomes independent and attains sovereign status with or without the consent of the rest of India, all these questions will not arise and that, I take it, will be the logical position if any scheme of partition comes into force. But if there has to be a Centre I do not see how we can escape defining and delimiting sphere and jurisdiction of the Centre and the Units. And once we begin looking at the problem from this point of view I am not without hope that Indian intelligence and ingenuity will be able to devise a formula which, while safeguarding the unity and safety of India, will give as wide powers as possible to the Units for their

administration. A minute and exhaustive definition and delimitation of the Provincial and Federal spheres ought to be able to remove any apprehension of interference by the Centre with the Units.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD.

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*Dr. Latif to Dr. Rajendra Prasad.*

*Adikmet,  
Hyderabad-Deccan,  
11th June, 1941.*

My dear Doctor Sahib,

Thanks for your letter of the 23rd ultimo. I have given to it my best attention and find that there are one or two points therein which need clarification.

In respect of the Centre and the Inter-relationship that should subsist between it and the Units, I had made two suggestions. One was that the Centre should be composite, no party or community holding permanently a commanding position over other parties. You are silent over this; but I think an expression of your opinion on this point is necessary. What is required is a helpful response from you. The Muslim fear of a Centre which is a genuine fear must be removed at all costs in the interests of the country as a whole. There may be a few among the Muslims who earnestly believe in complete separation. But the vast majority have allowed themselves to take refuge in the idea of Pakistan out of the natural fear that they will otherwise be submerged at the Centre

by the numerically larger Hindu community. If my plan of the Centre is not calculated to remove that fear, you may suggest something better. For, unless a plan is devised agreeable to the Muslims in general, the present move for a rapprochement, or for the matter of that any other, is not likely to make headway.

My other suggestion was that the units should enjoy "maximum freedom in their internal administration from the external Centre or the utmost possible autonomy consistent with the safety of India as a whole". You are willing to extend, if necessary, the powers of the Provincial governments and also to reduce "the residuary powers to a minimum by defining subjects falling within the sphere of the Centre and the Units as minutely and exhaustively as possible". Obviously that will not constitute "maximum freedom" from the Centre and "utmost possible autonomy" for units. It will simply amount to diluting the principle of the Act of 1935, which in every form will be distasteful to the Muslims.

What I visualize as a satisfactory solution is a federation of sovereign Units part of whose sovereignty is delegated to a composite Centre for federal purposes connected essentially with the safety and political unity of India as a whole. That being the objective, it will be necessary to specify first the subjects, few as possible, which should be delegated to the Centre, such as defence and foreign affairs, and reserve all others—the residuary—to the Units to be exercised without prejudice to agreed constitutional safeguards for minorities, whether Hindus, Muslims,

Sikhs or others. With powers so clearly differentiated, the country will not be exposed, as you might fear, to " conflicting policies dictated by the Centre and the Units ".

Such a plan will, in the first place, offer to the Muslims full autonomy in all those Units where they are in the majority ; in other words, allow them to have the substance or advantages of Pakistan without labouring under its disadvantages. In the second place, it will give equally full autonomy to the Hindus in all those Units where they are in the majority, and allow them the opportunity to reconstitute such Units even on a linguistic basis, should they so desire. Thirdly, it will, under the necessary constitutional safeguards, assure all minorities in all units of a free and full development. And lastly it will afford to the land a composite Central government representative of all constituent Units without allowing any single community or combination to hold the position of permanent domination over others.

You may release your reply to the Press along with this letter yourself, as I see that the country has begun to take an interest in this move and might like to know developments.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

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*Dr. Rajendra Prasad's Reply.*

*Sadaquat Ashram,  
Patna,  
9th July, 1941.*

My dear Dr. Latif,

Pray excuse the delay in writing to you. I received your last letter while on tour. The day I arrived here I was taken ill. I am only just recovering.

I do not feel like carrying on a discussion through correspondence on a question like this. I do not see that correspondence between you and me is likely to lead to any result. Besides, I think I covered all the points raised by you.

Yours sincerely  
(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD.

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## SECTION VI

*Correspondence with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the eve of their arrest in August, 1942.*

[ The above correspondence dated 6th August, 1942 and the resolution of the A. I. C. C. passed on 8th August, 1942, clarify the Congress position still further in respect of the "Substance of Pakistan" proposal dealt with in the previous section.

The Congress agrees to—

- (1) The units enjoying the right of secession and residuary powers ; in other words sovereign status ;
- (2) Largest measure of autonomy to units.

But in respect of the centre allowing no community or combination of units to dominate others, the Congress is silent. Negotiations, which were intended by the Congress to be opened the very next day after the A. I. C. C. resolution was passed but could not be done because of the Congress arrests on the 9th morning, would likely have clarified this issue too.

Mr. Jinnah's reaction to this correspondence and Dr. Latif's reply to it are also included in this section. ]

Full text of the letters exchanged between Dr. Abdul Latif and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad :

*Letter from Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif, dated  
Bombay, 6th August, 1942.*

Dear Maulana Sahib,

You may be aware that I have been endeavouring to seek, in my own way, a constitutional solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem. Lately some confusion appears to have arisen as regards the validity of a provision contained in the Congress Working Committee's resolution passed at Delhi at the time of the Cripps negotiations, which runs as follows :

“ Nevertheless, the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling any territorial unit against its declared and established will to remain within the Indian Union.”

The confusion has been caused by Mr. Jagat Narayan's resolution adopted by the A. I. C. C. at its last meeting held at Allahabad, because that resolution has been taken generally to have nullified the above-mentioned provision in the Delhi resolution.

May I, therefore, ask for your authoritative ruling whether this interpretation is correct, and whether Mr. Jagat Narayan's resolution has in any way modified or affected this provision ?

Further, you are reported in the Press to have made an offer that, if the League were prepared to come to a settlement with the Congress, the Congress Working Committee would appoint a few representatives to meet the League's representatives for the purpose. May I know whether the representatives of the League would in any way be debarred from discussing any proposals they might put forward for a permanent



settlement of the communal problem ?

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) S. A. LATIF.

*Letter from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,  
dated Bombay, 6th August, 1942.*

Dear Dr. Abdul Latif,

I appreciate your interest in raising the questions contained in your letter, dated August 6.

Had the speeches of responsible members of the Working Committee been duly noted in the Press, the confusion to which you refer in your first question would not have arisen. It was made fully clear by Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Pandit Nehru and myself at the time, and I repeat it now, that no part of the Delhi resolution to which you refer has in any way been affected or modified by any subsequent resolution of the A. I. C. C. In fact, the Delhi resolution was confirmed by the A. I. C. C.

With reference to your second question, it was never contemplated that the examination and discussion of the viewpoints of the representatives of the two organisations should not be free, frank and full ; in fact, it was fully understood that these representatives would in no way be under any restriction in their deliberations, and that the discussions would be subject only to the usual condition that their agreed decisions would be submitted to their respective bodies for ratification.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) A. K. AZAD.

*Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's reply to Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif, dated Bombay, 6th August, 1942.*

Dear Dr. Abdul Latif,

I have your letter of today's date. You have informed me that you have written a similar letter to the Congress President, and you have been good enough to tell me of his reply. It is hardly necessary for me to add anything to Maulana Azad's reply, which is fully authoritative. I need only say, if I may venture to do so, that I wholly agree with it.

The Congress position in regard to the proposal to divide up India into two or more parts is that any such division will be exceedingly harmful to both parts, as well as to India as a whole. I am personally convinced that probably our Muslim friends in the north-west of India will suffer most from such a division.

India, as it is, contains nearly all the important elements and resources that can make her a strong and more or less self-sufficient nation. To cut her up will be from the economic point of view, as well as others, a fatal thing, breaking up that natural economic unity and weakening each part.

The north will suffer most from this, because it is industrially not so advanced, nor does it contain some of the essential raw materials that are so necessary for a modern nation.

There are many other arguments against any division, but I need not go into them, as you are well aware of them yourself. There are, of course, also the sentimental, historical, and psychological argu-

ments, which, as you know, affect the people powerfully.

It is for all these reasons that there is a very strong feeling amongst us, and, we believe, amongst vast numbers of people in India, against any division of India. All these arguments are reinforced by recent world history, and in fact by the course of the war itself.

This has shown that small nations have no future before them except as hangers-on of larger nations. We do not want India or any part of India to be such a hanger-on, or a kind of semi-dependency political or economic, of any other nation.

In fact the tendency in the world is for larger federations to come into existence. Personally, I am convinced that the ultimate solution will lie in a world federation, and I am happy that a lead towards this has been given in the resolution that is going to be placed before the All-India Congress Committee tomorrow. Such a world federation will help in the solution of many vital problems and, among others, even the problem of national or other minorities will take a different shape.

In the resolution referred to above you will also find the Congress position in regard to a federation clearly defined. It is stated that India should have a Federal Government, with the largest possible autonomy for the federating units, and further that residuary powers should vest in these federating units. Personally, I must confess to you that I am not enamoured of this, as I think the modern tendency is against it, and rightly so.

It is essential today to have a planned economy for the nation, and for this, as well as for defence, etc., a strong Central Government is necessary. Nevertheless, we have agreed to this to meet the wishes of many of our friends who consider it important. I might add that this is no new decision of the Congress, as a similar decision was arrived at 11 years ago.

Thus generally speaking, the Congress stands firmly for the unity of India and for a Federation with a great deal of autonomy for the units. For this objective it works. Nevertheless at Delhi it made it perfectly clear that if any territorial unit was emphatically and clearly of the opinion that it should break with the Indian Union, it should not be compelled to act contrary to its wishes. Naturally, this would not be welcomed by us, and it would inevitably depend on certain geographical and other factors. That decision of the Congress Working Committee stands, and nothing has been said or done to modify or vary it in any way.

When Babu Jagat Narayan Lal's resolution came at the A. I. C. C. meeting at Allahabad, this was made perfectly clear by the Congress President, by me and by others. The wording of that resolution expresses the general wish and policy of the Congress, which has been the basis of our constitution and working ever since the Congress came into existence. There is nothing really new in it. This resolution does not in any way override the Delhi Working Committee's resolution. This is perfectly clear and beyond doubt.

Of course, if representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League meet together, they are free to

discuss any matter and to refer such matters as they choose to their parent bodies for decision.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

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## CONGRESS AND MUSLIM LEAGUE

### Press Statements

#### *Maulana Azad on Latif-Nehru Correspondence.*

*Bombay, August 8, 1942.*

The Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, interviewed by the Associated Press about the letter of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Dr. Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, to which Mr. Jinnah made a reference in his statement on the Latif-Azad correspondence, said :

“ My reply to Dr. Latif was not an expression of opinion, it was my ruling as the President of the Congress about the nature of a resolution. It was therefore not necessary for a member of the Working Committee to say that he agreed with the ruling of the President. The question of agreement or disagreement does not arise at all. The rulings are always meant to be obeyed.”—A. P. I.

#### *Mr. Jinnah's criticism of Azad-Nehru-Latif Correspondence.*

*Bombay, August 8, 1942.*

In the course of a press statement, Mr. Jinnah criticises the Bombay resolution of the A. I. C. C. and expresses himself as follows in respect of the correspondence which passed on the 6th August

between Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif and Maulana Azad, Congress President, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru :

" Another kite that they have been flying for the last few days is that the Congress is willing to come to a settlement with the League. Here again the proposal is disingenuous because they have laid down the basis of settlement to be the unitary (Is it?) federal government knowing full well that the Muslim League is opposed to such a basis.

" It is evident that the Congress has definitely turned down any discussion of the Muslim proposal of the partition of India or the Pakistan scheme, by their official resolution passed on the 1st of May, 1942, by the A. I. C. C. They have also individually, including Mr. Gandhi, adopted an adamant attitude towards the question of Pakistan, which is the basis of settlement for Muslim India. And Pandit Jawaharlal recently made it clear that he would not even discuss the partition scheme and that it was a mockery. I have noticed in the Congress Press (Is *The Times of India* a Congress paper?—not to speak of the other British journals all over India which published the correspondence), the pre-arranged correspondence which passed between a busy-body of a Muslim, who landed in Bombay the other day from Hyderabad into the Birla House on the one hand, and the Congress President, on the other, whom I pity, because he represents neither the Hindus nor the Musalmans and has really no voice in the counsels of the Congress, because the letter of the President to this individual had to be endorsed by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

“It leaves no doubt in my mind that they have made most contradictory statements with regard to the basis, suggesting that Congress and Muslim League Committees should meet, and interpreting the official resolution of the Congress passed on May 1, in a manner which is most dubious and misleading. What is one to think when Congress leaders resort to such a sort of procedure and give publicity to it in this manner instead of communicating the proposals, if they have any to me or to the Secretary of the All-India Muslim League? One can only conclude that it is meant for the edification of the public in this country and propaganda purposes abroad, and for a responsible organisation to resort to this method, if they are in real earnest for a settlement, is hardly compatible with their prestige and reputation, unless the intention is to create disruption amongst the Muslims and to mislead them. I am confident that these things cannot in the slightest degree mislead the Musalmans of India. Musalmans can no longer be treated as children.

“It is very painful to me to expose these tactics, but I have no other course to meet this sinister propaganda in which the Congress seems to have specialised. I know it is said that some of my statements hurt them, but if speaking out the truth, which is always bitter, and exposing the machination of our opponents so astute, hurts them, I cannot help it. The only remedy for them is that they should revise their methods.”—A. P. I.

*Reply to Mr. Jinnah's Statement of  
8th August, 1942.*

*Hyderabad-Dn.  
12th August, 1942.*

In a statement to the Press Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif replies to Mr. M. A. Jinnah and explains the circumstances which led to correspondence between himself and the President of the Congress and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in connection with the question of self-determination for the Muslims of India.

Dr. Latif says : " Mr. Jinnah's review of the correspondence which passed between me on the one hand and the President of the Congress and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the other is unfair both to me and to the Congress leaders concerned. Since the latter are not free\* to answer Mr. Jinnah and the responsibility for opening the correspondence was entirely mine it becomes my duty to explain the background to that correspondence. "

" Ever since Mr. Jagat Narayan's resolution was adopted by the A. I. C. C. in May at Allahabad, Mr. Jinnah and his chief lieutenants have gone on stressing that the resolution banged the door against any rapprochement between the League and the Congress. Their argument has been that that resolution set aside the resolution of the Congress Working Committee passed at Delhi wherein the right of self-determination for units had been recognised and thus debars the Muslim League from discussing

\* They were arrested on the morning of 9th August, 1942 at Bombay.



it as the basis of a settlement with the Congress. I, however, held a different view. So, when I was, in Bombay at the time of the last A. I. C. C. meeting, I found occasion to discuss the point with the President of the Congress and several members of its Working Committee including Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. My object was to find out whether the Jagat Narayan resolution really stood in the way of the Congress and the League coming together. I was assured that it did not ; whereupon I asked them to make a public announcement to that effect so that the path of negotiations between the League and the Congress might be smoothed.

“ The letters which in consequence were exchanged for publication between me and the Congress President, Maulana Azad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru have grievously displeased Mr. Jinnah. It looks as if he did not like the issue to be clarified. This is all a ‘ pre-arranged correspondence ’, he says. But what else is such correspondence as should be clear to him from his own personal experience ; and how does it lessen the value of the clarification it affords ?

“ The letters of the President and Panditji, adds Mr. Jinnah, ‘ are most contradictory ’, ‘ disingenuous, dubious and misleading ’, and are intended to intensify ‘ the sinister propaganda in which the Congress seems to have specialised.’ Argument fails when confronted with such an imposing array of epithets. I am afraid Mr. Jinnah has read too much into these letters. To me, however, they appear simple and straightforward in expression. While the letter of the Congress President gives an ‘ authori-

tative' ruling that the Delhi resolution is not annulled by the Jagat Narayan resolution or affected in any manner by it, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's letter emphasises that in spite of his personal views in the matter and of the general policy of the Congress, he and the other members of the Working Committee had adopted the Delhi resolution which made it 'perfectly clear that if any territorial unit was emphatically and clearly of the opinion that it should break with the Indian Union, it should not be compelled to act contrary to its wishes'. Such being the clear exposition of the point at issue, is it fair to maintain as Mr. Jinnah does, that the door is still banged against a settlement?

"Mr. Jinnah has a further argument to advance. He says that the A. I. C. C. by envisaging a federal constitution for India in its resolution adopted at its last Bombay session on August 8 'has ruled out of order their (Muslim) demand for Pakistan'. Where does he get this idea from? The Bombay resolution does not suggest or state it. Indeed, how can it do so as long as the Delhi resolution stands on which Mr. Jinnah can always fall back for his Pakistan?

"Arguments such as these only go to confirm the view held by the Congressites that Mr. Jinnah was never serious about a settlement with the Congress. For aught I can say, it is clear to my mind, from my talks with its leaders that the Congress on its part appeared sincerely anxious to settle its differences with the League and with its help and willing co-operation to rally the people of India for the defence of the country by forming an interim popular govern-

ment, even within the framework of the existing constitution, if nothing better was possible during the duration of war. In fact, it was contemplated that the Secretary of the Congress should address a formal letter to the Secretary of the League for opening negotiations at an early date.

"Now that the Congress has left the scene, what is the path the League is to pursue to improve the political situation in the country. That is the question uppermost in every mind. Will that body still continue to sit on the fence, or will it attempt to redeem its name for constructive statesmanship?"—A. P. I.

## SECTION VII

*Press statements of Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif chiefly concerning the ending of the political deadlock and the formation of an Interim Government and the League's attitude in respect of them.*

### INTERIM GOVERNMENT

*Hyderabad-Dn.*

*January 3, 1942.*

In a statement to the Associated Press on the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif says :

“The Congress Working Committee has again crawled into a blind alley. If it was really anxious to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis at this grave hour, it should have at first come to terms with the Muslim League without whose co-operation no Government could be formed truly representative in character.

“The Committee should have concentrated its attention on the immediate present even as the Muslim League has done and reciprocated its offer of co-operation with it and other parties in prevailing upon the British Government to allow them to form a truly representative Indian Government both at the

Centre and in the Provinces during the duration of the war without prejudice to the major political issues involved in the framing of a future constitution for India.

“To insist on a settlement of the question of India’s independence as a condition of participation in the defence of the country is to provoke the Muslim League to insist on a prior settlement of the independence of the Muslims in an independent India on the lines of Pakistan. Since this issue will not be considered by the British Government unless the Congress and the League and other parties come to some compromise between themselves, the Bardoli resolution of the Congress Working Committee which meant to be a significant gesture to the British Government will bear no fruit. The British Government cannot settle anything directly with the Congress over the head of the Muslim League. The Congress must realise this and make amends in proper time if it is in earnest to help the country to defend herself on what it calls a ‘national basis’.

“If the Congress and the League come together in their present hour of peril, and stand shoulder to shoulder to ward off the impending danger to their land, I have every hope that when the time comes to frame a new constitution for India, the two great organisations will cheerfully re-adjust their respective outlooks and evolve a constitution agreeable to both.”  
—A. P. I.

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## ON NON-PARTY LEADERS' BOMBAY CONFERENCE

*Madras, March 27, 1942.*

The resolution of the Non-Party Leaders' Conference in Bombay and Mr. Jinnah's statement in the Central Assembly to hold over the Pakistan scheme and the possible reactions these would have on the decisions of the forthcoming session of the All-India Muslim League and on the solution of the present political deadlock were discussed by Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad-Deccan, who is now here, in an interview to the Associated Press.

Dr. Latif said: "The resolution passed by the Leaders' Conference at Bombay seems to be the inner voice of Gandhiji speaking through instruments tacitly kept in reserve for use in emergencies. It is a faltering back to the position taken up by the Congress at Poona. I do not think, therefore, that Muslims will be inclined to consider the Bombay proposals unless these things are clarified and the proposals bear the official stamp of the Congress as well."

Referring to the Muslim League he said: "As for the Muslim League, it was repeatedly announced that it would not stand in the way of a settlement. Indeed only a few days ago, Mr. Jinnah made an offer from his seat in the Central Assembly to hold over his Pakistan scheme till after the war and to co-operate in forming a Government within the framework of the present constitution. The offer is accommodating to a generous degree, although I

cannot say what the general Muslim public will think of it. A rapprochement will have to rest on a much wider basis than the provision of seats on the Central Executive for each of the two parties. The Muslims in the Provinces where they are in minority are anxious to know in what way their interests will be safeguarded under the Lahore scheme of the Muslim League or under any settlement that might be reached with the Congress or the British Government.”—A. P. I.

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#### ON CRIPPS' MISSION

*Hyderabad, April 13, 1942.*

“Sir Stafford Cripps’ negotiations with Indian leaders should not be regarded as a failure,” said Dr. Abdul Latif, in an interview. “Differences which were so vague and indeterminable hitherto, between the Government and Indian leaders on the one hand, and among the different Indian parties themselves on the other, have now been clarified and narrowed down, so that when everyone concerned gives further thought to each other’s point of view in the light of the paramount duty of combining against the danger of foreign invasion, I dare say a solution will be found which is agreeable to all.”

Dr. Latif added: “I am glad of one thing, namely, that the attitude taken by the Muslim League is not only correct but helpful. In respect of

long-range demands it has simply asked for the elementary right of self-determination. Whether the Muslim League will insist upon exercising that right ultimately will depend greatly on the attitude which the Congress adopts.

“Regarding the interim arrangement, the League has wisely been silent since, until the larger issue of the powers of the proposed composite Government are made more clear, the Muslim League will not be in a position to determine its proper share therein.”  
—A. P. I.

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ON MR. C. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR'S MOVE :

“RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION”

*Hyderabad, May 2, 1942.*

“The counting of mere heads at Allahabad has gone against Mr. Rajagopalachariar. But what of that? The moral victory is certainly on his side. He stood for robust commonsense,” says Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif on the result of the discussion on Mr. Rajagopalachariar's motion at the meeting of the A.I.C.C. to-day.

Dr. Latif says : “While the Congress High Command has been simply talking of Hindu-Muslim unity, Mr. Rajagopalachariar has shown the way how to bring it about speedily. Has the Congress any better plan ?



"If that body is really in earnest about making a joint endeavour with the Muslim League for India's defence and independence, it looks clear that sooner or later it will have to fall into line with Mr. Rajagopalachariar, for his proposal embodies the barest minimum that might induce Muslims to take the question of rapprochement with Congress into consideration.

"Mr. Rajagopalachariar does not advocate partition. He only concedes a natural right which belongs to every cultural unit, namely, the right of self-determination. He concedes this right to Muslims even as Mr. Gandhi has done several times in his own way.

"Whether that right will be exercised by the Muslims in all its rigidity or fullness when the time comes for settling India's future independent constitution will depend upon the behaviour, in the meantime, of the Congress and non-Muslim organizations. But no agreement between the Muslims and the Congress is possible unless the right in question is conceded in advance.

"Mr. Rajagopalachariar, like a clear-sighted statesman, sees the wisdom of it. If the Congress High Command cannot see eye to eye with him to-day, they will have to do so to-morrow, provided it is not too late then. At all events, I hope that all those in the land, who have no taste for sheer melodrama, will rally round Mr. Rajagopalachariar and make his idea a success."—A. P. I.

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ON CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE'S "QUIT INDIA"  
RESOLUTION

*Hyderabad (Dn.), July 18, 1942.*

Commenting on the Congress Working Committee resolution, Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif says: "Going into the wilderness as the Congress resolution threatens to do, will do no good to the Congress. It will have grave repercussions all over the country. If Mr. Gandhi and the Congress really want independence for India and not a Congress Raj now and after the war, they must seize the opportunity for an honourable settlement with the Muslims which Mr. Jinnah offered only a couple of days ago, and all will still be well. A united voice will be irresistible; for then, nobody can deny Indians their right to defend their own country against foreign invasion. It will open the way to independence as nothing else can. I have always advised my Congress friends to look up to Mr. Jinnah and not to Mr. Churchill or President Roosevelt for the solution of India's difficulties. If they are wise, they will establish immediate contact with the Muslim League and come to some settlement."—A. P. I.

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## ON MR. JINNAH'S POLICY

*Political issues clarified*

[While every attempt was being made to persuade the Congress to reach an honourable settlement with the League, Mr. Jinnah continued to prove more and more

offensive in his public references to Mr. Gandhi, so much so that when the climax was reached in his statement of the 31st July 1942 making the task of compromise impossible, Dr. Latif felt called upon to express publicly his sense of sorrow over the language Mr. Jinnah was employing in his discussion of public affairs. The following is his famous appeal and protest to the Muslim League.]

*Hyderabad (Dn.)*

✓ *August 3, 1942.*

In an exclusive interview to the Associated Press, Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif criticises Mr. Jinnah's attitude towards Mr. Gandhi and calls upon the Muslim League to co-operate with the Congress and other parties to bring about an immediate revision of the Cripps' proposals such as might wean Mr. Gandhi from his threatened course.

Dr. Latif says: "The resolution of the Congress Working Committee, when shorn of its propaganda phraseology, seems to amount to no more than a demand for immediate revision of the Cripps proposals in certain directions. What the Committee actually wants, as it seems to me, is that the Viceroy's Executive Council should, for the duration of the war, function as a sort of Cabinet composed, with the exception of the C.-in-C. as War Member, entirely of Indians representing the leading political parties in the land, the Viceroy undertaking not to exercise his veto or any checks open to him under the existing constitution against the *unanimous* opinion of the Indian members of the Executive Council, and that

the Indian Defence Member should be allowed some natural voice in the shaping and control of the country's defence policy without prejudice to the technical direction of military operations in India by the British C.-in-C. or to Allied strategy. This is what the Congress means by 'independence in action' or immediate withdrawal of British power from India. Whatever the phraseology employed and however offensive a part of it may be, it is clear from the trend of public opinion in India that the predominant majority of Indians in all camps, including the Congress, will be satisfied if the above two changes are effected in some agreeable manner in the proposals brought here by Sir Stafford Cripps. An immediate revision of the Cripps' proposals is worth making. It might wean Mr. Gandhi from his threatened course.

"If that were done voluntarily by the British Government, the act will have a grace of its own. But, if it is so punctilious about formalities to be observed even at such a time, the party leaders should meet and formulate a joint proposal. I trust that the A.I.C.C. will see to it through its decisions that the chances of such a meeting and of negotiations with Government are not jeopardised.

"As a preliminary to a meeting of party leaders, I think that the Congress and the League should reach an honourable settlement such as might be agreeable even to the other parties. The differences between the two revolve, as I have noticed, round two main issues. One is in respect of the future constitution of India, involving the right of self-determination for the Muslims of the north-west and north-east.

The other concerns the distribution of power between the different parties in any interim Indian Government formed at the Centre. Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals are clear enough in respect of the future constitution. Besides, the right of self-determination is hedged in by so many conditions that none should fear that in case the Muslims exercise this right any injustice will be done to any non-Muslim community. As for the distribution of power between the different parties, there should be no serious difficulty in arriving at an agreeable solution. What matters who gets a seat more for a little while, if the main object of forming such a Government is to consolidate the entire energy and resources of the whole of India and successfully ward off by force of arms, even as endorsed by the Congress President, every form of aggression by the Axis enemy powers?

" Hopes of the two parties settling their differences were raised a few days ago when Mr. Jinnah invited Mr. Gandhi through the press to seek an honourable settlement and Mr. Gandhi responded to the invitation by asking Mr. Jinnah to 'accept the Congress President's offer that Congress and League representatives should put their heads together and never part until they have reached a settlement.' But on July 31 comes a press statement from Mr. Jinnah throwing overboard the Congress offer. That statement has saddened me immensely for other reasons as well, and I am sure many Muslims all over the country. Instead of pursuing the move for an honourable settlement initiated by himself he not only side-tracks it at a critical moment, but rakes up old memories

and pours abuse and ridicule over the head of Mr. Gandhi, the one man with whom he will have ultimately to reach a settlement. And he does this in a language and style so alien to Muslim cultural traditions.

“Mr. Jinnah has many personal virtues ; but his manners as a leader, his treatment of political opponents, his obstructionist tactics and his aggressive method of presentation of the Muslim standpoint have all gone to weaken what is intrinsically a strong cause of the Muslims which, I know, he deeply loves. He must know that the intellectuals among the Muslims, particularly the younger generation, are growing increasingly restless over his politics. If Mr. Jinnah would lay his hand on his heart and reflect, he would feel that during these three years of war, he has been simply sitting on the fence, surrounded by a docile and colourless Working Committee of his own creation, awaiting opportunities of but temporary gain, or quarrelling with the Congress on the one hand and some of his own colleagues in the League on the other over issues of petty prestige, or nursing unsophisticated Muslim masses on slogans of a brand of Pakistan, the full and numerous implications of which I have reason to believe, he and his Working Committee have neither studied nor attempted to grasp. He has unfortunately lulled himself into the belief that if he could only carve out two small so-called independent States for the Muslims in the north-west and north-east, he would have solved for all times the problem of Indian Muslims.

“The real Muslim problem does not concern so

much the Muslims of those parts where they form a majority and can on that account look after themselves under any constitution, as it concerns the Muslim minorities from Delhi, Lucknow, Patna downwards to Cape Comorin, who will be rendered eternal orphans under Mr. Jinnah's plan. Besides, Hyderabad, the stronghold of Muslim culture and the rallying point for the Indian Muslims, will be permanently segregated from the main current of Muslim life in India, and, who knows, eventually smothered for ever. I have found Mr. Jinnah incapable of conceiving the hundred millions of Muslims in India as an indivisible entity and that we can secure all the advantages of even his Pakistan without having to labour under its inevitable disadvantages by setting the scheme against an all-India background.

I do not want to pursue this point further at this stage. But I venture to submit to Mr. Jinnah for his very earnest consideration that his present politics will decidedly lead to civil war, which every sensible Muslim should endeavour to avoid. I fervently trust that he will try to forget old memories of any unkind treatment of him by Congress or Hindu leaders, and to close with them on every honourable term for the duration of the war, and jointly co-operate with the British and their Allies to repel the impending yellow peril. If a compromise with the Congress is found really not possible, which I refuse to believe or anticipate, then the Muslim League must get into the Central Government and play its part with or without the co-operation of other parties. For I am convinced in mind that we Muslims

have nothing in common with the yellow civilization of Japan but much at variance in fundamentals, and will perish culturally if that civilization ever takes hold of India.—A. P. I.

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DR. LATIF'S CRITICISM OF LEAGUE RESOLUTION  
OF AUGUST 1942

*Hyderabad (Dn.)  
August 22, 1942.*

Commenting on the latest resolution of the Muslim League, Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif says :

"Every sincere well-wisher of the Muslim League will deeply regret the resolution adopted by its Working Committee in Bombay. With the Congress off the scene, the responsibility for leading the country had devolved on the League, the next largest party in the land. The task before that body was to generate an atmosphere conducive to an honourable compromise between the Congress and the League on the one hand, and between these two and the British Government on the other.

"This was a moment when Mr. Jinnah should have made a supreme effort to rise equal to the occasion. Had he done that, he would have caught the imagination of the people and maintained Muslim reputation for constructive statesmanship. But he would not. He wants other parties to come to him including the British Government and make a present to him of an undefined Pakistan, before he would consider any proposals they might suggest to form



an interim popular Government and rally the people for the defence of the country. He would not himself go to them or take the initiative, no matter what the danger, internal or external, which confronted the country. Is this attitude helpful even to the Muslims ?

“Why does Mr. Jinnah go on endlessly harping on Pakistan and side-tracking the more immediate and paramount issue of the defence of the country ?

“The British Government, through the Cripps plan, conceded to the Muslims the necessary right of self-determination. So has the Congress done. They might not have expressed themselves in the language of Mr. Jinnah ; but to those who understand the British and the Congress, the offer in this respect is clear enough. To insist on a clarification of what has already been clarified is a waste of precious time and will vitiate the political atmosphere still further.

“If Mr. Jinnah is truly alive to the reality of the danger inherent in the present situation and is anxious to improve it, he should entertain no longer cheap notions of party prestige, but straightway seek contact with Mr. Gandhi and prevail upon him to agree to a formula, honourable alike to the British Government and the people of India, including the Muslims. Let him put Mr. Gandhi and the British Government to an acid test and then his position would be unassailable. If unfortunately he fails in the attempt, the blame for the failure will lie at others' doors and not his. That is a duty he must discharge not merely in the interests of Muslims,

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but the country at large.”—A. P. I.

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INTERIM GOVERNMENT : FORMULA

*Dr. Latif's letter to Mahasabha's President.*

*New Delhi,  
September 23, 1942.*

The political discussions which have been in progress among some members of the Central Legislature, stimulated by Dr. Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, have resulted in a new plan for popular Provisional Governments at the Centre and in the Provinces. This plan is set forth in the course of a letter, which Dr. Abdul Latif has addressed to Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherji in reply to the Mahasabha President's circular letter of September 3.

“The existing deadlock ” he says, “ seems to be due, in a large measure, to the leading parties in the land concentrating their attention more on an uncertain future than on the definite and immediate present. The insistence of the Congress and the Mahasabha on a declaration of India's right to independence here and now by the British Government as a condition precedent to the formation of a popular provisional Government and an equal insistence by the League on a simultaneous declaration of the Muslim right to an independent ‘Pakistan’, have helped the British argument in favour of holding over the question of formal independence of India till after the war. So long as this triangular intransigence

in respect of the future continues, there is little prospect of the present deadlock ending.

"If things are to improve, my candid opinion is that our political parties must cease to attach undue importance to formal declarations of rights, at least till the war situation grows better and the British are in a freer frame of mind. If that item is held in abeyance, there is no reason why a settlement among the Indian parties touching the interim arrangement should not be reached at an early date. The necessary transfer of power or responsibility thereafter to representative Indian hands to the extent they will need it to rally the people successfully for the defence of the country and to contribute to Allied victory cannot be withheld by any sensible British Government.

"It will be your concern, therefore to persuade leaders of the Congress and the League not to insist, for the time being on any formal declarations such as they want by the British Government, but jointly to seek an interim arrangement satisfactory to the country at large. With that purpose in view, you may, on behalf of the Mahasabha, renew your attempt to interview Gandhiji ; and who knows you might succeed this time to meet him. You may, at the same time, resume your negotiations with Mr. Jinnah. He may seem to be intransigent over the issue of 'Pakistan'. But if you can assure him that, without prejudice to that issue, your Mahasabha would be willing to co-operate with the League to form a provisional composite Government, with or without the Congress coming in, it is possible that

he might review his attitude in this matter and fall into line with you. For, after all, when all is said, I have no doubt that he must be feeling sad indeed over the present situation and would be happy, if he could prevent the country from drifting into further confusion.

"If unfortunately you fail to prevail upon Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah, you will have to make the best of a bad situation and try to see if the British Government could allow the parties outside the Congress and the League to run an interim Government till the two major parties come to a settlement. But, before you turn to this desperate alternative, it will be up to you to do your utmost to reach an agreement with at least the Muslim League. Remember that the country in its helplessness is anxiously looking up to its leaders for a speedy solution of the deadlock, and will not forgive them if even at such a grave hour in its life, they let it fall a victim to their party manoeuvrings.

"What the line is to be of a settlement with the British Government in respect of the interim arrangement, will no doubt, engage the serious thought of all parties. But I may tell you that I have had informal discussions on the subject with several leading members of the Central Legislature. The consensus of opinion seems to favour the following plan :

(1) The Viceroy's Executive Council should be a composite Government responsible to the Crown but responsive to the legislature and should function as a Cabinet.

(2) Its members should all be Indians with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief as Extraordinary Member. A slight amendment will be necessary in the Government of India Act for the purpose.

(3) The Indian Defence Member should exercise powers similar to those exercised by Defence Ministers in Canada and Australia without prejudice, however, to the direction of war operations by the Commander-in Chief.

(4) The parties willing to form the provisional Government will select a leader, whom the Viceroy will call upon to select his colleagues from the different parties as may be agreed upon by them and form the Government.

(5) The Government so formed should undertake to resign in a body if serious differences arise between them and the Viceroy.

(6) Provincial Governments should be formed on the same basis as suggested for the Central Government."—A. P. I.

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#### REVISION OF LEAGUE'S POLICY URGED

*Hyderabad (Dn).  
October 2, 1942.*

"Mr. Amery's Caxton Hall speech (29th. Oct. 1942) on 'India's future' should serve as an eye-opener to the Muslim League, particularly because Mr. Amery is looked upon by its Executive as its friend and guide," says Dr. Abdul Latif in a statement to the press.

Continuing Dr. Latif says, "The famous August

offer of 1940 on which Mr. Jinnah bases all his strength and hopes is now paraphrased by the very person who was responsible for that offer. And that paraphrase makes it clear that a Pakistan in isolation, such as Mr. Jinnah dreams of, is not a happy vision. On the other hand it is inclined to favour a scheme such as I have consistently, through all my writings, tried to commend to the League under which India would be a Union of *sovereign* States including one in the north-west and one in the north-east where Muslims are in the majority with a constitution allowing the combining States the 'largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession' the Centre to look after a 'minimum of subjects assigned to it in mutual interest'. Mr. Amery is, no doubt, aware of the genuine Muslim fear of a Centre where the Hindus might dominate by virtue of their superior numbers in the country taken as a whole. Hence it is, he advises as a remedy, that a system should be evolved under which 'no one element should be in a position to oppress another,' or as I have put it in my writings 'no single community or combination to hold the position of domination over others'.

"Such being the constitutional outlook of Mr. Amery, and indeed of the British Government, is it too much to expect that the League's Executive will review its policy in time and cease to feed the Muslim masses on blissful thoughts of a 'Pakistan in isolation'? The bitter experience of small sovereign States in isolation at the present day cannot be disregarded. The wiser course is to concentrate all energy

on securing a Pakistan organically linked, on agreed terms, to the rest of India in the interests both of the Muslim majorities in the north-west and north-east, and of the Muslim minorities in Hindu areas. The League should realise that the conditions which warranted the urge for separation or partition no longer exists. The Congress has grown wiser. It has now taken a long step to placate the Muslims. It has agreed to let 'federating units' have the largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and even the right of secession. Through proper negotiations, it should not be difficult to complete the picture in a manner satisfactory to the Muslims."

Referring to Mr. Amery's reply to Mr. Riley, in the House of Commons, Dr. Latif said that it was an encouraging reply. "Modifications in the Cripps' plan," says Dr. Latif "would be made if the Indian parties made a joint demand to that effect. It is up to the Viceroy, however, to afford facilities for joint consultations between the different parties including the Congress."—A. P. I.



ON MR. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR'S NEW PROPOSAL  
FOR INTERIM GOVERNMENT

*Madras,  
26th October, 1942.*

"Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar has made another earnest attempt to end the existing deadlock. He is confident that his plan this time would meet with the approval of the Congress, the League and the British

Government. His aim is to establish a National Government without insisting on an immediate declaration of India's right for independence as the Congress wants or a simultaneous declaration of the Muslim right for self-determination as desired by the Muslim League. But he makes his proposed National Government responsible to the legislature to be newly formed in accordance with the provisions in this behalf of the Federal part of the Act of 1935. Such a plan might appeal to the Congress. It might indeed be taken by them as 'independence in action'. But I am doubtful whether the British Government or the Muslim League would easily agree to the proposal. The events of the last few months have clearly shown that the British Government is not willing to concede during the duration of the war anything substantially different from what has been offered through the Cripps' plan. They might, under pressure, agree to fully indianise the Viceroy's Executive Council without prejudice to the conduct of war operations by the Commander-in-Chief, or to Allied strategy. They might also agree to the Defence Member possessing powers more or less similar to those enjoyed by Defence Members in Australia and Canada. They might even let the Executive Council function as a Cabinet. But to let a war-time Executive Council be responsible to the Legislature instead of to the Viceroy or the Crown as at present might not be agreeable to the British Government in their present mood.

As for the Muslim League, Mr. Rajagopalachariar knows that the Federal part of the Act of 1935 is



anathema to that body. Any attempt to bring into force any provision of it, particularly a vital provision such as the formation of a Legislature to which the Executive Council would be responsible, might be construed, especially when viewed in the light of all its implications, as pre-judging and even side-tracking the issue of Pakistan on which that body has pinned all its faith. The offer to the League to nominate any number of its representatives it liked to the Executive Council might be a tempting offer, but it will not likely reconcile the League to the thought of the Federal part of the Act of 1935 operating in any form without categorical assurance from the British Government on the one hand and from the Congress on the other, to the effect that the proposed arrangement will not in the least affect the Muslim right for self-determination when an independent constitution for India will be framed. This apart, the League might insist on their proportion in the Executive Council to be reflected in the Legislature, if the Executive Council is to be responsible to it.

“ These are some of the complications which I anticipate if Mr. Rajagopalachariar's plan is pressed for acceptance in its present form. I would suggest for his earnest consideration whether it would not serve the purpose in view if the question of making the Central Executive responsible to the Legislature is dropped out of his scheme and his whole attention concentrated on having the Cripps' plan altered, with the concurrence of the Congress and the League so as to convert the Viceroy's Executive Council in

practice into a stable cabinet possessing reality of power and composed of men enjoying the confidence of the leading political parties in the land."—A. P. I.

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MR. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR'S CRITICISM OF  
DR. LATIF'S STATEMENT

Extract from the speech of Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar delivered at Madras on 28th October, 1942 criticising Dr. Latif's statement of the 26th October regarding the former's scheme of an Interim National Government :

"A possible objection from League quarters might be that the freedom given to the Muslim League representative to choose his own number for the Cabinet was unsubstantial inasmuch as the members chosen would all be responsible to a Legislature whose composition was bound to be predominantly Hindu and Congress. This objection had not, he knew, been so far taken by the League or by journals directly associated with that body but by some 'who looked at the proposal as men working in laboratories examine objects.' Dr. Latif, the speaker said, had gone one better than Mr. Jinnah in looking for holes in the proposal. Incidentally, he mentioned that though Dr. Latif's criticisms of Mr. Jinnah some months back were not taken notice of, the latest utterance of Dr. Latif had been prominently mentioned and commented upon that very afternoon by a British observer, who was in this country for the 'enlightenment' of his countrymen. Any National

Government, formed for the period of the war, Mr. Rajagopalachariar explained, would be a composite one, based on agreement among all the parties. Such a Government could not be thrown out unless the agreement itself was to be destroyed. Such a Government would be there for the duration of the war and would be assured of support just as Churchill's National Cabinet, Roosevelt or Stalin were."  
—*Speech reported by the A. P. I.*

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DR. LATIF'S REPLY TO MR. C. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR

*Hyderabad (Dn.)  
31st October, 1942.*

In reply to Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar's letter inviting Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif to help him to clarify the issue he (Mr. Rajagopalachariar) was pressing for—the ending of the deadlock between Britain and India—Dr. Latif has released the following letter addressed to Mr. Rajagopalachariar :—

“ I should have liked the matter to be personal as your letter says. Since you have met my views in a public speech before receiving my reply I hope you will not misunderstand me if I release to the public this letter in the interest of the subject common to us.

“ You know that I am one of those who are anxious that the Congress and the League should enter into a rapprochement between themselves. I take into consideration other parties as well. In fact, there are friends who are moving a resolution to this effect at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the All-

India Muslim League on the 9th of November. They may not succeed, but one step is enough for me. You have sought clear help from me in your letter ; and I believe I have given you the necessary help.

“ You may not understand the psychology of the Musalmans and of Mr. Jinnah. I fancy I understand that psychology. You think that I have gone a step beyond Mr. Jinnah. I am struggling against him within his own limits. Only I do not like his political habits, particularly his treatment of political opponents. He is for isolation of Pakistan. I am for linking that Pakistan to the rest of India organically. The difference is only in the strength of the vision we respectively enjoy. The coming generation will understand this. If you can recognise the right of self-determination for Muslims, one of two ways will prevail—either isolation of Pakistan or linking it to the rest of India. The Muslim plebiscite will decide it.

“ If you, and the Congress through you, can recognise this elemental principle of political life and say that the Central Executive by being responsible to the Legislature, even under the Act of 1935, will not affect in any manner, the issue of Muslim self-determination, things will clarify themselves in a manner agreeable to everybody. /

“ You are controverting against yourself unnecessarily. Hold out in a categorical language the assurance that you are not side-tracking the Muslim view of self-determination and all will go well with your plan.”—A. P. I.

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## LEAGUE'S POSITION ANALYSED

*Hyderabad (Dn.)**February 2, 1943.*

"Yesterday the Muslim League appeared to hold a key position in Indian politics. But how does it stand to-day?" asks Dr. Abdul Latif in a review of the present political situation and continues: "Mr. Jinnah in his latest utterance at Bombay complains that the key has passed on to other hands. If that is so, who is responsible for it? Several opportunities did present themselves to the League last year to take the lead in improving the situation; but one by one they were thrown away in sheer petulance. Its supreme moment came during the first week of August last when the Congress, at my instance, clarified its attitude *vis-a-vis* the 'Pakistan.' It was an earnest attempt to placate the Muslim League. The Congress held out the largest measures of autonomy to units, residuary powers and even the right of secession. All that argued sovereign status to units including Pakistan areas. The Congress also looked forward to the opening of formal negotiations with the League to afford further clarification of its attitude if necessary. But Mr. Jinnah would not appreciate the move. Instead, he stiffened his intransigent attitude by calling upon the British Government on the one hand and Indian political parties on the other, first to guarantee an undefined Pakistan before he would entertain proposals from them for the formation of an interim provisional Govern-

ment to rally the people for the defence of the country.

“What was the response? The Congress Executive was by now in jail and could not speak. The Mahasabha at first did try to make overtures, but soon realized that counter-intransigence was the only answer to Mr. Jinnah. The Depressed Class leader, Dr. Ambedkar, refused to involve himself in what he considered a mere personal feud between Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi. Even Mr. Rajagopalachariar forsook Mr. Jinnah in despair; while Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer, Dewan of Travancore, in what he considered the abiding interests of Indian States, was not prepared to understand him. From the British side also nothing encouraging came forth. A representative in India of the *Daily Herald* through whom Mr. Jinnah must have expected to influence the British mind was impressed not so much by the Pakistan politics as by his similitude to the film star George Arlis, immaculately dressed in borrowed colours. The Viceroy, representing all that he represents, gave Mr. Jinnah a cold shoulder, and friend Mr. Amery, forgetting every promise made in the past, seriously put the question to himself whether Akbar's plan of administration would not suit future India. On the top of all this, the Turkish Mission chose to administer a *coupe de grace* to all expectations of active sympathy from independent Muslim countries by making it clear in their reply to the League Secretary's address that Turkey was not interested in the domestic squabbles of India, such as 'Pakistan.'

“This is the position to which the League has now

been reduced. To disturb its equanimity still further and complicate the situation, Mr. Rajagopalachariar has evolved a new technique to hoist the League with its own petard. 'Have your pound of flesh' says he in effect to Mr. Jinnah 'a tiny lump to the west of Lahore and a tiny lump round about Dacca and Mymensingh, poverty-stricken patches. That is the utmost that you can have in terms of your Pakistan resolution and your creed. Have it. It will be a good riddance for us ; for then, we Hindus shall be free to have a strong Central Parliamentary Executive for the rest of India, a single-party government under whose dispensation your Muslim minorities shall have to live.'

"How does all that strike Mr. Jinnah ? Will he, for a moment, think that he is simply eddying about in blind uncertainty obsessed with meaningless egoism ? The Muslim League on his account is still a concern of the easy-going—of those who would lie in ambush to pounce upon gains gathered by others. It is to meet shortly at Delhi to review its position in an open Annual Session. Will the balanced minds in the camp, assert themselves in favour of softening Mr. Jinnah's angularities and earnestly seeking a contact with the Congress leaders in jail and the British Government, the parties which matter, to soften their angularities as well, and reach a settlement agreeable and honourable to everyone concerned ? I trust that the League will not go round yet another barren year."—A. P. I.

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## ON PROPOSED DEPUTATION TO THE VICEROY

*Madras,**27th March, 1943.*

Referring to the task before the proposed Non-Party Leaders' Deputation to His Excellency the Viceroy, Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, who is at present in Madras, in a statement says:

"I am not hopeful that the proposed Non-Party Deputation will achieve anything tangible. The method of approach seems to me defective. The reconciliation which the deputation seeks to effect between Mr. Gandhi and the Viceroy is not evidently for its own sake, but has for its object the formation of a composite government for the duration of the war. And how can this be fulfilled without reference to the Muslim League? The deputation is proceeding clearly from the wrong end; for, whatever other issues that might be raised in the deputation's discussions either with the Viceroy or with Mr. Gandhi, no settlement can be reached in respect of the interim or post-war arrangement without taking into consideration the attitude of the League. Display of haste to seek an interview with the Viceroy is certainly not warranted under the circumstances.

"The right course yet is to come to a settlement with the League before proceeding any further. Leave aside that body's extreme demand of absolute partition. That is to be settled by a Muslim plebiscite when the time comes. Possibly that plebiscite might not support the League's idea of Pakistan in isolation, but might decide in favour of linking Pakistan



organically to the rest of India, as those of my way of thinking would prefer. That, however, is a domestic problem of the Muslims. But every non-Muslim political element in the land would do well to recognise the Muslim right of self-determination which is their minimum demand and on which, I may make it perfectly clear, Muslims of every shade of opinion are solidly united. The Congress has acceded to this principle through its Delhi resolution of April 1942, clarified categorically in the correspondence addressed to me by the Congress President and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru while the A. I. C. C. was in session in Bombay last August. It is, therefore, up to the other parties to reflect whether it is not desirable for them too to take up a similar attitude in the matter. This is the indispensable initial step that the Non-Party Leaders, composed as they are mainly of Mahasabhaites and Liberals, will have to take if they have to make a distinct contribution to the removal of the deadlock.”—A. P. I.

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ON DR. AMBEDKAR'S PROPOSAL TO END DEADLOCK

*Hyderabad (Dn.),  
19th May, 1943.*

Commenting on Dr. Ambedkar's proposals from Bombay to end the Indian political impasse, Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif says:

“It is a significant development in Indian politics that Dr. Ambedkar has now come to realise the need for a ‘National Government during the war.’ But the plan he suggests is somewhat tortuous. He regards

Pakistan as a preliminary issue. But he would like it settled without reference either to Mr. Jinnah or Mr. Gandhi. He desires the people of the Pakistan areas to prevail upon the British Parliament to pass a legislative measure styled 'The Indian Constitution Preliminary Provisions Act' providing for an immediate referendum separately of Muslims and non-Muslims in the areas concerned, the appointment thereafter of a boundary commission, a further referendum at the end of the war, and lastly the setting up of a council representative of Hindustan and Pakistan.

"There is no doubt that some procedure or other will have to be adopted to let the issue be decided on the basis of self-determination. But is this the time for it? The very initial step contemplated of a referendum in war-time on an issue over which feelings are bound to run high will, I am afraid, throw the country into confusion.

"I do not think that even fire-eaters among the League would like to force the pace of events to the extent Dr. Ambedkar recommends. The League will be content if a formal assurance is given by the Congress in particular, that Muslims will be allowed to exercise, if they so desire at the time of framing a new constitution for India after the war, their right of self-determination in respect of Pakistan. Not that such an assurance has not already been given. It is implicit in the right of secession conceded to units by the Congress. Only the League insists that the assurance should be expressed in categorical language. This, I dare say, the Congress will do to the League's

satisfaction. But it must have the facility to do it. If Dr. Ambedkar is really anxious to make a tangible contribution to the removal of the deadlock and pave the way to the formation of a National Government, the easiest and the quickest method is to persuade his colleagues in the Government to adopt a policy of reconciliation and help Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah to meet and discuss things in order that a way might be found for an honourable settlement of the Indian problem, both interim and post-war."—A. P. I.

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ON GANDHI-JINNAH LETTER

*Hyderabad (Dn.),  
May 31, 1943.*

Commenting on the attitude assumed by Mr. Jinnah in respect of Mahatma Gandhi's letter to him, Dr. Abdul Latif says: "Whatever view one might take of Mr. Jinnah's latest performance, one thing is clear. The League has now lost the position of vantage which it occupied since the Congress went off the scene. That position had given the League the privilege to take the initiative to end the deadlock and thereby add to its strength and influence. This privilege Mr. Jinnah has petulantly thrown away without even consulting his Working Committee. As a result, the League will now have to recede into the background and occupy itself at best with provincial intrigues till the end of the war, or till the deadlock is resolved through the efforts of other agencies.

"The real deadlock is between the Congress and

the British Government. That between the League and the Congress has been given importance because of the major deadlock and as a handy argument against the Congress. Once the Congress and the British Government reach a settlement which they will do one day in each other's interests, the League will either have to fit into it willy-nilly or go into the wilderness. That is the fate which will stare the League in the face to-morrow if its rank and file do not in time realise whither they are drifting.

"Mr. Jinnah had a splendid opportunity to play the rôle of mediator between the Congress and the British Government and bring about a reconciliation and achieve the League's object too with their mutual goodwill. But obsessed as he is with his innate and insatiate desire to humiliate his political opponents, particularly Mr. Gandhi at every turn, he could not display qualities befitting that rôle.

"Mr. Jinnah's latest behaviour has placed the League in a decidedly false position. What is Muslim politics worth if it chooses to discard its moral touch? The hour indeed calls for a serious searching of hearts on the part of the League's Working Committee and of its Council and for a reorientation of their policy and method of work. Or else they will be leaving for the younger generation a legacy of trouble, by no means easy to surmount.—A. P. I.

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